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MOTHERS AND DOCTORS' ORDERS: UNMASKING
THE DOCTOR'S FIDUCIARY ROLE IN
MATERNAL-FETAL CONFLICTS
Michelle Oberman*
I. INTRODUCTION
Conflicts between pregnant women and their doctors may arise at any
time during prenatal care, from the counseling given to women prior to
conception to the treatment of women during labor and delivery. Doctors
and their pregnant patients may disagree over when and whether to utilize
prenatal, and even preconception, testing.1 They may differ over maternal
lifestyle issues such as smoking, drinking alcohol, substance abuse, exercise
and work.2 They may disagree about the wisdom of pursuing innovative
therapies designed to ameliorate a fetus's potentially disabling condition.3
Finally, they may conflict at the point of labor and delivery, as happens
when patients reject invasive medical technology and procedures utilized to
monitor, expedite or otherwise intervene in the birth process.4
Professor, DePaul University College of Law. I am indebted to Professors Katharine Baker, Sal-
lyanne Payton, John Roberts, and Jane Rutherford for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this
Article. I gratefully acknowledge the tireless research assistance ofArdyth Eisenberg, Kim Horvath and
Kim Warren, without whom this Article could not have been completed. In particular, I want to recog-
nize Kulsum Ameji, whose profound collaboration, support, and friendship broke all conventional
boundaries (as is her wont) of "research assistance." My thanks are due also to Dean Teree Foster and
to the DePaul University Faculty Research Fund for all of the support I received during the gestation of
this project.
I For example, a doctor may advocate, and a patient resist, testing for genetic markers linked to dis-
ability, such as fragile-X syndrome or Tay-Sachs disease. See, eg., Renee C. Esfandiary, The Changing
World of Genetics and Abortion: Why the Women's Movement Should Advocate for Limitations on the
Right To Choose in the Area of Genetic Technology, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 499 (1998).
2 See infra notes 127-45 and accompanying text (discussing doctors' responses to substance abuse
by pregnant women).
3 See Katherine A. Knopoff, Comment, Can a Pregnant Woman Morally Refuse Fetal Surgery?, 79
CAL. L. REV. 499,502 (1991).
4 The literature discussing this issue is voluminous. See, e.g., Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions
and Interventions: What's Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 51-53 (1987); Susan
Markens et al., Feeding the Fetus: On Interrogating the Notion of Maternal-Fetal Conflict, 23
FEMINIST STUD. 351 (1997); Lawrence J. Nelson, Legal Dimensions of Maternal-Fetal Conflict, 35
CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 738 (1992); Rayna Rapp, Constructing Amniocentesis: Mater-
nal and Medical Discourses, in UNCERTAIN TERMS: NEGOTIATING GENDER IN AMERICAN CULTURE 28,
33 (Faye Ginsburg & Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing eds., 1990); Matthew C. Reid & Grant Gillett, The Case
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Although the specific facts surrounding each conflict vary, these di-
lemmas all arise out of the same paradigm. A physician perceives an ideal
course of treatment, predicated upon the well-being of the pregnant woman,
the fetus, or both. He advises the woman of his concerns, and recommends
a particular course of action.5 Rather than acquiescing, the pregnant woman
resists the physician's advice, causing the doctor grave anxiety over the
potentially negative consequence to his patient or her fetus. He therefore
enlists outside help in the hopes of persuading the woman to change her
mind. This help may come in the form of counselors or allied health pro-
fessionals; it may also entail veiled or explicit threats of legal intervention if
the woman is unwilling to follow medical orders. Depending upon the con-
text, continued resistance on the woman's part may lead the doctor to seek a
court's permission to compel the woman to adhere to medical advice.6
Over the course of the past fifteen years, these conflicts have been
termed "maternal-fetal" conflicts, and they have generated a veritable cot-
tage industry for scholars in legal, medical, ethical, religious and philo-
sophical circles.7 At the center of the maternal-fetal conflict debate is the
question of when and whether it is appropriate for the law to dictate a preg-
nant woman's behavior in an effort to benefit her unborn fetus. The medi-
of Medea--A View of Fetal-Maternal Conflict, 23 J. MED. ETHICS 19-25 (1997); Bonnie Steinbock,
Maternal-Fetal Conflict and In Utero Fetal Therapy, 57 ALB. L. REv. 781 (1994). Indeed, the writings
on this topic have been prolific enough to wan-ant a bibliography, Maternal-Fetal Conflict: Legal and
Ethical Issues (Bibliography), in NATIONAL REFERENCE CENTER FOR BIOETHICS LITERATURE,
KENNEDY INSTITUTE OF ETHICS, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C. (1990).
5 Historically, at least in the United States, male physicians have dominated the practice of obstet-
rics. As such, this Article occasionally uses the male pronoun when referring to doctors in hypothetical
scenarios.
6 Several authors have documented the problems associated with such judicial intervention, not theleast of which arises from the circumstances under which the judges render their decisions. In many
cases, for example, judges conduct hearings from the hospital, or even the bedside, with attorneys and
expert witnesses in attendance. See Watson A. Bowes & Brad Selgestad, Fetal Versus Maternal Rights:
Medical and Legal Perspectives, 58 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 209 (1981). Further complicating
these makeshift "adjudicative proceedings" is the fact that the pregnant woman is close to delivery and
experiencing pain. The doctor, whom the woman should be able to trust, suddenly is cast as her adver-
sary. The presence and involvement of the lawyers and judges is daunting in any situation, let alone at
the bedside ofa birthing. Often, the woman does not even speak sufficient English to understand what
is transpiring. More commonly, the woman does not have a representative at the proceeding and thus
the judge hears only the physician's view. In addition, as time is of the essence, the lawyers and thejudges are often ill-informed and unprepared to deal with the exigency at hand. The only survey of ac-
tual judicial interventions to date found that in 88% of the cases, orders were obtained in less than six
hours, and in 19%, in less than one hour, once by telephone. See Veronika E.B. Kolder et al., Court-
Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1192, 1193 (1987). See also Alicia Ouel-
lette, New Medical Technology: A Chance to Reexamine Court-Ordered Medical Procedures During
Pregnancy, 57 ALB. L. REV. 927, n.84 (1994).
7 See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING
OF LIBERTY 40 (1997) (positing slave owners' dual interest in both slave mothers and children as the
prototypical "maternal-fetal conflict"); see also Kolder, supra note 6. See, e.g., articles cited supra note
4 (addressing maternal-fetal conflicts from a variety of perspectives).
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cal, ethical and legal literature on "maternal-fetal conflict" is rich in analy-
sis of the competing rights of mother and fetus. Yet, for all their depth and
diversity, the overwhelming majority of articles reach an identical conclu-
sion: in all but the most extreme circumstances, it is impermissible to in-
fringe upon the pregnant woman's autonomy rights.8
In spite of this powerful consensus, "maternal-fetal" conflict has not
dissipated. Indeed, over the course of the past decade, lawyers, doctors,.
ethicists and the general public have engaged in a frenzied effort to analyze
and resolve a burgeoning series of new "conflicts." 9 Legal and academic
debates over the clashing "rights" of mothers and fetuses have emerged in
various contexts, including substance abuse by pregnant women, home-
births, mandatory HIV screening in prenatal care, and a pregnant woman's
rights to utilize a living will.1° These deliberations over the appropriate
course of action in the newest incarnations of maternal-fetal conflict again
focus on whether and to what extent women should be permitted to make
decisions that their doctors believe to be disadvantageous to their fetuses.
And, as in the past, there is a near universal consensus that it is impermissi-
ble to infringe upon pregnant women's autonomy rights."
The question that remains, then, is why these debates persist. 12  This
Article will argue that it is primarily because the underlying paradigm of
8 See, eg., Gallagher, supra note 4, at 56-58; Markens et al., supra note 4, at 352 (calling court-
ordered cesareans "disturbing"), Nelson, supra note 4, at 745 (noting the consensus). There are, of
course, several exceptions. See, eg., Joel Jay Finer, Toward Guidelines for Compelling Cesarean Sur-
gery: Of Rights, Responsibility, and DecisionalAuthenticity, 76 MINN. L. REv. 239, 274-78 (1991); Jef-
frey A. Parness, Crimes Against the Unborn: Protecting and Respecting the Potentiality of Human Life,
22 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 97, 171-172 (1985); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of
Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405,410-11 (1983).
9 A current example of this "cottage industry" is seen in the growing literature discussing a pregnant
woman's right to refuse intra-uterine therapies designed to remedy a variety of potentially disabling
conditions in the fetus. Ironically, although such conflicts plainly are foreseeable, to date, neither legal
nor media sources have reported a single incident of such a conflict. See, e.g., Knopoff, supra note 3;
Krista L. Newkirk, State-Compelled Fetal Surgery: The Viability Test Is Not Viable, 4 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 467 (1998); Ouellette, supra note 6; David C. Blickenstaff, Comment, Defining the
Boundaries of Personal Privacy: Is There a Paternal Interest in Compelling Therapeutic Fetal Sur-
gery?, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1157 (1994); Scott R. DeBonis, Comment, The Fetal Maternal-Conflict: Ju-
dicial Resolution Based upon Constitutional Rights, 22 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 479 (1995); Kathleen
Rauseher, Comment Fetal Surgery: A Developing Legal Dilemma, 31 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 775 (1987).
10 See, eg., Sam S. Balisy, Maternal Substance Abuse: The Need to Provide Legal Protection for
the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1209 (1985); Chris Hafner-Eaton & Laurie K. Pearce, Birth Choices, the
Law, and Medicine: Balancing Individual Freedoms and Protection of the Public's Health, 19 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 813 (1994); Michelle Oberman, Test Wars: Mandatory HIV Testing, Women,
and Their Children, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 615 (1996); Molly C. Dyke, Note, A Matter of Life
and Death: Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will Statutes, 70 B.U. L. REV. 867 (1990).
11 See articles cited supra note 4; see also Ouellette, supra note 6. Indeed, the virtually unanimous af-
firmation of the pregnant woman's autonomy rights is seen even in discussions of conflicts that, to date,
remain entirely hypothetical. See Gallagher, supra note 4 (regarding the potential "problem" of matemal
refusal ofintra-uterine therapies). But see Finer, supra note 8; Pamess, supra note 8; Robertson, supra note 8.
12 One obvious answer might be that they serve as a fertile source of fodder for the tenure gods.
94:451 (2000)
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"maternal-fetal" conflict is fundamentally flawed and incomplete. Under
the present framework, each new conflict is presented as an isolated and
extraordinary case in which fetal well-being is threatened by the uncaring
behavior of pregnant women. One of the primary parties to these con-
flicts-the doctor-is entirely missing. This omission is critical, as these
conflicts originate in the context of the relationship between the doctor and
the pregnant woman. Specifically, they result from doctors' seemingly
well-motivated efforts to promote maternal or fetal well-being by imposing
their perception of appropriate medical care on their pregnant patients.
Hence, these are not maternal-fetal conflicts at all, but rather maternal-
doctor conflicts.' 3
The construction of these conflicts as "maternal-fetal," or arising between
pregnant women and their fetuses, begins when doctors project their own esti-
mations of the optimal course of action onto their pregnant patients. When a
pregnant woman resists medical advice, the doctor often invests the fetus with
interests and rights that directly coincide with his own personal treatment pref-
erences. The pregnant woman's interests are then rendered in direct opposition
to those attributed by the doctor to her fetus. Hence, the "maternal-fetal con-
flict." Finally, the doctor steps in as a seemingly neutral arbitrator who is well
situated to settle this "conflict." But as it is the doctor who identifies the
course of action deemed to be "in the fetus's best interests," the doctor is, by
definition, not neutral. Rather than balancing the competing rights of mother
and fetus, the doctor becomes just another party to these conflicts-one who
always tips the balance 2:1 against the pregnant woman.14
The result of structuring these conflicts as involving dueling claims on
behalf of maternal autonomy and fetal well-being is that each issue is ana-
lyzed anew, and each generates the same increasingly tiresome discussion
of these rights. This reactive analysis ignores the context in which these
conflicts arise: they involve doctors and patients who meet in a private re-
lationship in the health care setting.'5 And yet, because the maternal-fetal
13 I am indebted to Professor Timothy F. Murphy for coining the phrase "maternal-doctor" conflict,
and generally, for his rich insight into the manner in which pregnant patients are "exceptionalized" to
their grave detriment. It is important to acknowledge that the term maternal in "maternal-fetal" conflicts
is both misrepresentative and reductionist It reduces the pregnant woman to what is, at most, one facet
of her identity-and should the conflict arise in the course of her first pregnancy, one that may not yet
be part of her identity at all. Moreover, because "mother" carries with it connotations of loving altruism,
the notion of a conflict between mother and fetus implies that, by refusing to follow medical advice, the
mother has cruelly betrayed the sacred trust between mother and child. However, because the entire
genesis of these conflicts emanates from the fact that the doctor sees the patient only as a mother, the
name "maternal-doctor conflicts" best describes these situations.
14 I am indebted to Professor Katherine Baker for her assistance in elucidating this point.
is Although beyond the scope of this Article, it is important to note that the contemporary maternal-fetal analysis is ahistorical and uninformed by the history of the medical profession's efforts to cast
pregnancy as a medical condition, to be treated by medical professionals, with the use of a dynamic ar-
ray of popular medical treatments and technology. Several sources detail this history: BARBARA
EHRENREICH & DEIRDRE ENGLISH, FOR HER OWN GOOD: 150 YEARS OF THE EXPERT'S ADVICE TO
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analysis eclipses the doctor's role in generating these conflicts, one scarcely
notices that each instance of such conflict represents a dramatic violation of
the legal and ethical norms that govern doctor-patient relationships.
This Article offers a new analysis of maternal-doctor conflicts--one
that makes visible the role of the doctor in generating these conflicts. Part
II begins with a description of the fiduciary aspects of the traditional doc-
tor-patient relationship, setting an analytical foundation and framework for
the legal and ethical analysis of these scenarios. Part In reviews a series of
commonplace maternal-doctor conflicts, demonstrating several ways in
which doctors violate their fiduciary duty to their pregnant patients. Fi-
nally, having resituated these conflicts to accurately reflect the instrumental
role played by doctors, Part IV articulates a set of legal strategies designed
to prevent, or at least remedy, the harms caused when doctors attempt to
impose their will upon their pregnant patients.
II. FIDUCIARY DUTY IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP
Over the course of centuries, the common law notion of a fiduciary re-
lationship has moved far beyond its original mooring in the law of trust and
agency, and now encompasses a variety of forms and constituents. 16 In her
landmark article on fiduciary law, Professor Tamar Frankel demonstrates
that the twentieth century has "witness[ed] an unprecedented expansion and
development of the fiduciary law," such that the category of fiduciary now
includes "agents, partners, directors and officers, trustees, executors and
administrators, receivers, bailees, and guardians . . . .,A7 In the course of
this expansion, the fiduciary model was applied to the doctor-patient rela-
tionship, and doctors and commentators, and later judges, came to refer to
doctors as fiduciaries.
Widespread adoption of fiduciary terminology in reference to doctors
and patients began in the 1980s. Leslie Miller's landmark articles on in-
formed consent declared that the doctrine of informed consent is an out-
growth of the Anglo-American concept of the fiduciary relationship."' 8
Physicians' increasing comfort with the fiduciary terminology is seen by of-
ficial statements of the two principal associations for American physicians,
the American Medical Association and the American College of Physicians,
WOMEN (2d ed. 1989); David A. Grimes, Technology Follies: The Uncritical Acceptance of Medical
Innovation, 269 JAMA 3030 (1993); Michelle Oberman, Women, Fetuses, Physicians, and the State:
Pregnancy and Medical Ethics in the 21st Century, in HEALTH CARE ETHICS: CRITICAL ISSUES FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY 67,68-75 (John F. Monagle & David C. Thomasma eds., 1998).
16 The law governing trusts and agency broadly defines fiduciary as one who is "entrusted with
power or property to be used for the benefit of another and legally held to the highest standard of con-
duct." Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and Obliga-
tions in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241,243 (1995).
17 Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 795-96 (1983).
1S See Leslie J. Miller, Informed Consent: 1, 244 JAMA 2100,2100 (1980).
94:451 (2000)
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which utilize the fiduciary model when describing the relationship between
physicians and patients.m
For several decades, federal and state courts alike have acknowledged
the fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship. Indeed, courtshave termed the physician-patient relationship a "fiduciary" one since at least
the mid-1960s.2 By the 1990s, judges frequently employed the fiduciary
law construct when assessing doctors' obligations to their patients. For ex-
ample, in Herdrich v. Pegram, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found
that "the fiduciary trust between plan participants and plan fiduciaries no
longer exists[,] ... where physicians delay providing necessary treatment
to, or withhold administering proper care to, plan beneficiaries for the sole
purpose of increasing their bonuses." 2' State courts have been even more
explicit in applying the fiduciary model to the doctor-patient relationship.22
As a result of the foregoing, it is utterly commonplace to refer to doc-
tors as fiduciaries for their patients.23 In reality, however, although the fi-
duciary model accurately describes the doctor-patient relationship, doctors
have eschewed the legal regulations that are associated with fiduciary rela-
tionships.24 Absent the enforcement mechanism provided by such legal
regulations, there is little means for patients to hold doctors to the fiduciary
standards they profess to have embraced.
19 For example, an American Medical Association report on managed care concluded that conflicts
between the physician and the patient "must be resolved to the patient's benefit... ." due to the "physi-
cian's role as a fiduciary, i.e., a person who, by his undertaking, has a duty to act primarily for another's
benefit ..." The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association, Report
6, at 3, Dec. 1986. See also the American College of Physicians' ethical code, which declares that the
physician is "the advocate and the champion of his patient, upholding the patient's interests above all
others." AD Hoc COMM. ON MED. ETHICS, AM. C. OF PHYSICIANS, AM. C. OF PHYSICIANS ETHICS
MANUAL, Part 1, cited at 101 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 129, 134 (1984) [hereinafter COUNCIL ON
ETHICAL AND JUD. AFF.]
20 See Hanmonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 799 (N.D. Ohio 1965). "We are of the
opinion that members of a profession, especially the medical profession, stand in a confidential or fiduciary
capacity as to their patients ... " Id at 799, quoting Alexander v. Knight, 177 A.2d 142,146 (Pa. 1962).
21 Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 373 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3177 (U.S.
Sept. 28, 1999).
See, eg., Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. 793; Neade v. Portes, 710 N.E.2d (Ill. App. Ct. 1999), citingPetrillo v. Syntex Lab., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 961 (III. App. Ct. 1981) ("Illinois courts have recognized
that a fiduciary relationship exists between a physician and his patient."); Shadrick v. Coker, 963
S.W.2d 726, 736 (Tenn. 1998) ("Dr. Coker and Shadrick had a confidential or fiduciary relationship by
virtue of having a doctor-patient relationship .... ); Branom v. Washington, 974 P.2d 335, 342 (Ct.
App. 1999) ("Washington recognizes that the physician-patient relationship is a fiduciary one."). But
see Wadsworth v. ABC Ins., 732 So. 2d 56 (La. Ct. App. 1998); D.A.B. et al. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d
168, 171-72 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting claims for breach of fiduciary duty which would have had
the effect of either extending a tolled medical malpractice statute of limitations, or of allowing a second
recovery under the same set of facts).
23 "The idea that physicians are or should be fiduciaries for their patients ... is a dominant meta-
phor in medical ethics and law today and is presumed by much of the legal and ethical analysis of physi-
cians' conflicts of interest." Rodwin, supra note 16, at 242.24 See infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
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In the following sections, I will describe the limited version of fiduci-
ary duty applicable to doctors, and the various ways in which this model
generates negative consequences for patients. As later sections will demon-
strate, the harm that results from this hollow fiduciary construct is not re-
stricted to pregnant patients, but nowhere is the betrayal of fiduciary duty
more blatant and extreme than in the context of prenatal care.
A. The Limited Fiduciary Nature of the Doctor-Patient Relationship
The law recognizes three primary structures of legal relationships:
status, contract, and fiduciary.25 The status relationship is one in which one
party has no choice about the terms of the relationship, or even about en-
trance into or exit from the relationship. The classic model for this type of
relationship is the medieval interaction between lord and vassal.26 Although
the interaction between doctor and patient may be unbalanced in terms of
choice-because the doctor is sought out by the patient, of the patient's
own volition, and because the patient can terminate the relationship at any
time-it is nonetheless clear that the relationship is not one of status.27
The classic contract relationship is one in which both parties are pre-
sumed to be motivated by self-interest, and because they are therefore po-
tentially in conflict, each must protect herself from the other's self-
interested behavior. The law's main role in governing these relationships is
"to prohibit the use of force and monopoly, and to enforce the rules [that]
the parties freely set for themselves." 28 The fact that patients contract with
doctors for services may give their interaction the aura of a contract rela-
tionship, yet this aura is belied by the situational reality of the "contracting"
parties. Clearly, the defensive, antagonistic posture inherent between par-
ties in the contracting relationship contrasts sharply with the traditional
caretaking notions that inform the doctor-patient relationship.
In a fiduciary relationship, one party is dependent upon the other, but
not nearly to the extent of a status relationship. The "entrustor" (as Frankel
refers to the dependent party in the fiduciary relationship) relies upon a fi-
duciary to provide her with a specific service, but she selects the fiduciary,
and the relationship exists only to further her own needs. This relation
therefore is also distinct from contract relations, in which both parties seek
to have their needs met.29 Fiduciary relations require the entrustor to dele-
25 See Frankel, supra note 17. For a fascinating discussion of the vitality of these categories in a
modem capitalist economy, see Freidrich Kessler's classic article, Contracts of Adhesion-Some
Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943).
26 See Frankel, supra note 17, at 801-02.
27 Frankel defines the status relationship as one in which "one party, (the Power Bearer) usually has
a partial or full monopoly over the means for satisfying the needs of the other party (the Dependent).
The Power Bearer can coerce the Dependent into service and obedience by manipulating, increasing, or
decreasing the satisfaction of the Dependent's needs." Id. at 798.
28 Id. at 800.
29 Id. at 800-01.
94:451 (2000)
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gate power to the fiduciary in order that the fiduciary may act on her behalf.
Professor Marc A. Rodwin describes the manner in which doctor-patient
relationships resemble "classic fiduciary relationships":
Physicians have specialized knowledge and expertise. They also control
the use of medical resources needed by patients: only they can admit patients
to hospitals, order diagnostic tests, and prescribe drugs. Patients are often ill or
anxious about their health, which increases their dependence. The patient-
physician relationship presupposes patients entrusting physicians to act on their
behalf and physicians remaining loyal to their patients.- 0
Physicians themselves have embraced the fiduciary model as descriptive of
the doctor-patient relationship, frequently incorporating it into their profes-
sional codes.'
Because fiduciary relations originate when the "entrustor" delegates power
to the fiduciary to act on her behalf, all fiduciary relations raise the potential for
abuse of that power.3 2 In considering this potential for abuse, Frankel argues
that, "the purpose of fiduciary law should be to solve this problem, and that the
differences in the rules applicable to various fiduciary relations stem from dif-
ferences in the extent of the problem. 3 3 Professor Rodwin summarizes the
various legal mechanisms for promoting fiduciary accountability:
[The law] reduces fiduciary discretion or prohibits suspect transactions; it
regulates or supervises fiduciaries; it imposes penalties when fiduciaries breach
their trust and provides remedies for those harmed .... Often there are ade-
quate remedies for misbehavior. In cases where monetary damages would be
inadequate, however, courts often supervise fiduciaries directly. But when su-
pervision would be too costly or would reduce the value of fiduciary work, the
law prohibits certain transactions as a preventive measure.34
Thus, to the extent that physicians are their patients' fiduciaries, one would ex-
pect to find carefully tailored rules that limit doctors' ability to inappropriately
exploit the power they have over their patients. Ironically, although doctors
possess much of the power over their patients that comes with fiduciary status,
doctors have been virtually exempt from the regulation and scrutiny by outsid-
ers that marks traditional fiduciary relationships.3 As Professor Rodwin con-
30 Rodwin, supra note 16, at 245-46.
31 See supra note 19 (listing several examples).
32 Frankel, supra note 17, at 804.
33 Id. at 807-08.
34 Rodwin, supra note 16, at 247.
35 Professor Marc Rodwin's corpus of work on doctors and fiduciary duty is premised on the fact
that "the laws holds doctors accountable as fiduciaries only in restricted situations." Id. at 242. See also
MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (1993).
458
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eludes in his thorough study of the field, fiduciary law principles have been ap-
plied to physicians in only a narrow set of circumstances.3 6 In short, "Courts
and legislatures have not developed comprehensive fiduciary obligations for
physicians and do not consistently hold them accountable as such. 37
There is no rich body of case law articulating broad fiduciary standards
for physicians, the violation of which would constitute a distinct form of
malpractice. Despite the fact that doctors are considered fiduciaries, there
is no line of cases in which doctors have been found liable for acting in
ways that ignore or undermine a patient's best interests. Indeed, although
the issue of fiduciary duty occasionally arises in the context of medical
negligence actions, it is used only as a vehicle for evaluating the physician's
technical clinical competence, generally as it relates to the duty to obtain an
informed consent.38 Thus, the only physicians likely to be accused of
breaching fiduciary duty under the present regime are those who have acted
in a manner also recognized as violating the medical standard of care (for
example, by performing an inappropriate medical procedure). This leaves
unremedied a host of abuses of physician authority-abuses that should be
classified as breaches of fiduciary duty.3
9
As a result of the law's limited application of fiduciary principles to
physicians who abuse their positions of power over patients, maternal-
doctor conflict is not seen for the breach of fiduciary duty that it represents.
Instead, doctors' actions are judged through the lens of existing medical
malpractice law and, as is the case with other instances in which physicians
breach their fiduciary duty to their patients, only those doctors whose ac-
tions deviate from an articulated standard of care are held accountable for
violating their patients' trust. In other words, doctors are held accountable
for the breach of fiduciary duty only insofar as the breach also constitutes
medical malpractice. In order to expose the inadequacy of this approach to
the breach of fiduciary duty, Subpart B discusses the specific challenges to
fiduciary duty that arise in the health-care setting.
B. Challenges to Fiduciary Duty in the Health Care Setting
The current structure of the U.S. health care system generates at least
three types of challenges to physicians' loyalty to patients: conflicts arising
But see infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text (regarding federal regulations against physician self-
dealing).
36 "These include requiring that physicians not abandon patients, keep information that they learn
confidential, obtain patients' informed consent to treatment, and in one case, disclose to patients any fi-
nancial interest in clinical research." Rodwin, supra note 16, at 247-48.
37 Id. at 248.
38 See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Cal. 1972); Miller v. Kennedy, 522 P.2d 852, 860 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1974), aff'd 530 P.2d 334 (1975); Lockett v. Goodill, 430 P.2d 589, 591 (Wash. 1967); Rod-
win, supra note 16, at 247, citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
39 See infra notes 40-47, 55, 89 and accompanying text for a description of such unregulated abuses.
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out of the physician's role as gatekeeper, conflicts relating to the duty of
confidentiality, and conflicts resulting from the patient's right to autonomy.
Maternal-doctor conflicts fall under this last category, and I will therefore
discuss it at greatest length. First, however, I will describe the fiduciary
challenges arising out of doctors' duties as gatekeepers and their obligations
to maintain patient confidentiality.
1. Divided Loyalties and the Physician as Gatekeeper. The most fre-
quently cited issue in the contemporary literature on a doctor's divided loy-
alties is the set of problems relating to the physician's role as the
"gatekeeper" who controls access to, and information concerning, medical
care. Contemporary mechanisms for health care delivery and finance have
generated a host of potential conflicts for physicians. These conflicts range
from issues such as self-dealing (in which physicians make referrals for
care to entities in which they have a financial stake) to the broader issue of
how physicians ration resources on behalf of health care organizations (which
may stand to lose money on a given patient), health care payors (which may
resist covering the cost of medical care), health care plans (which may em-
ploy the physician), or society at large (as the ultimate health-care payor).4°
These new conflicts join a list of similar, longstanding conflicts, such as
those facing government physicians who evaluate patients in the context of
eligibility for disability income, military service, or fitness to stand trial.41
Recently, lawmakers have endeavored to limit some forms of divided
loyalties. Beginning in 1994, Congress passed a series of federal fraud and
abuse regulations that sanction physicians who engage in self-referrals. 42
Additionally, both federal and state legislators are struggling to draft laws
40 For a detailed discussion of physician conflicts of interest stemming from financial and other
structural interests, see Rodwin, supra note 16. For additional consideration of the challenges to regu-
lating physicians' financial conflicts of interest under managed care, see Mark Hall, A Theory of Eco-
nomic Informed Consent, 31 GA. L. REV. 511, 514 (1997); Michael D. Reagan, Health Care Rationing:
What Does it Mean?, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED 1149, 1151 (1988).
41 Arlene K. Daniels, Military Psychiatry: The Emergence of a Subspecialty, in MEDICAL MEN
AND THEIR WORK 145, 145-46 (Eliot Freidson & Judith Lorber eds., 1972); Edmund G. Howe, Ethical
Issues Regarding Mixed Agency of Military Physicians, 23 SoC. SCI. & MED. 803, 803 (1986); Michael
D. Reagan, Physicians as Gatekeepers: A Complex Challenge, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1731, 1731-32
(1987); Anne 1R Somers, And Who Shall Be the Gatekeeper? The Role of the Primary Physician In the
Health Care Delivery System, 20 INQUIRY 301, 310-11 (1983); Deborah A. Stone, Physicians as Gate-
keepers: Illness Certification as a Rationing Device, 27 PUB. POL'Y 227, 227-29 (1979).42 The Ethics in Patient Referral Act (Stark I), 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1994) (effective Jan. 1, 1992)
(prohibiting physician self-referrals for laboratory services); Comprehensive Patient Ownership and Re-
ferral Act (Stark I1), 42 U.S.C. § 1359nn (1994) (effective Jan. 1. 1995) (prohibiting physician self-
referrals for designated services). For an in-depth analysis of this legislation, see Marc A. Rodwin, The
Organized American Medical Profession's Response to Financial Conflicts of Interest: 1980-1992,
MILLBANK Q. 703, 731-32 (1992). In a recent Eighth Circuit case, the court held: "When an HMO's
financial incentives discourage a treating doctor from providing essential health care referrals for condi-
tions covered under the plan benefit structure, the incentives must be disclosed and the failure to do so is
a breach of ERISA's fiduciary duties." Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1997).
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that would bar managed care entities from including "gag clauses" in their
contracts with physicians. 43 These clauses may limit a physician's ability to
discuss health care treatment options that are not covered by a patient's
health care plan, to refer patients to specialists who are outside of the pa-
tient's plan, or to disclose the method by which he or she is compensated. 44
To date, these efforts to craft viable legislation have failed, leaving patients
with no more recourse than to wait and see if they are harmed as a result of
the physician's failure to disclose additional treatment options. If that oc-
curs, patients then have the option of bringing a traditional negligence law-
suit against the physician, arguing that they were injured by the doctor's
failure to inform them of all of their options and that such failure consti-
tuted a breach of duty for which they must be compensated.45
Notwithstanding ongoing legislative efforts, gatekeeper instances ofdivided loyalties are viewed as unavoidable conflicts, similar to those that
arise for attorneys in their capacity as officers of the court as well as advo-
cates for their clients. Malpractice law has yet to hold physicians liable for
actions motivated by financial conflicts of interest.46 Although state medi-
cal licensing boards establish competency standards and have the power to
sanction physicians, their standards typically proscribe only the most egre-
giously fraudulent conduct. To date, none have issued conflict of interest
guidelines.47
43 As of June 1999, the 106th Congress was considering nine comprehensive managed care reform
bills. Although the bills' features varied markedly, all would prohibit gag clauses. See Healthcare Re-form, HEALTH LAW DIGEST, June 1999, at 35. In 1996, the Healthcare Financing Administration
banned gag clauses in contracts with Medicare HMO physicians. See CNN Interactive, U.S. Bans 'Gag
Orders' on Advice for HM0 Medicare Patients, (posted Dec. 7, 1996) <http'J/cgi.cnn.comJUS/9612/07/
hmo.reportlindex.html>. Additionally, 46 states currently have laws that set some limits on gag clauses.
See Families USA, The Variability of State Managed Care Consumer Protection Laws (visited June 21,
1999) <http:llwww.familiesusa.orgmanagedcare+u/TABLE.HTM>.
44 See Julia A. Martin & Lisa K. Bjerknes, The Legal and Ethical Implications of Gag Clauses in
Physician Contracts, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 433, 441-42 (1996); Jennifer L. D'Isidori, Stop Gagging Phy-
sicians!, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 187, 194 (1997).
45 Doctors complain of being caught between a rock and a hard place in this context. Undoubtedly,
they are. However, they fail to recognize that these dilemmas are at least partly of their own making:
doctors could not be forced into such choices if they had professional standards requiring disclosure as a
part of their fiduciary duty. Thus, the remedy lies not in tort reform (which limits the patient's right to
compensation for an injury that results from the lack of information), but rather, in articulating clear pro-
fessional standards favoring full disclosure.
46 Rodwin, supra note 16, at 249. For example, despite evidence that physicians have prescribed
and been compensated for unnecessary tests and surgeries, no malpractice litigation arises out of these
practices unless the patients can demonstrate that such practices violated the standard of care and caused
them harm. The fact that the physician advocated a course of action because it maximized his or her
personal wealth is not, in and of itself, viewed as a violation of fiduciary duty. (My sincere gratitude to
Professor Sallyanne Payton for her insights on this topic.)
47 Rodwin, supra note 16, at 249 (noting that "[s]ome boards sanction physicians for 'character unbe-
coming of a physician,' but only where there is fraud, criminal conviction or other egregious conduct").
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2. Divided Loyalties and the Duty of Confidentiality. Ancient medical
principles require doctors to maintain in strictest confidence information
obtained from a patient in the course of rendering treatment.48 The common
law imposes a duty of confidentiality upon physicians, forcing those who
disclose information inappropriately to pay damages.49 The promise of con-
fidentiality is tacitly understood by patients, who rely upon it when they
disclose highly personal information to their physicians. The physician acts
as fiduciary, using the confidential information in order to treat the patient,
and safeguarding the secrets from others.
On occasion, however, the physician may be inclined, or even re-
quired, to share the patient's information with others. There are several
well-established exceptions to the duty of confidentiality-circumstances
under which the law mandates that the physician divulge confidential in-
formation to a third party.50 Mandatory reporting laws explicitly exempt
the disclosing physicians from liability, thereby exonerating them from ac-
cusations of having breached fiduciary duty.5' It is critical to note, how-
48 The Hippocratic oath states: "Whatever in connection with my professional practice or not in
connection with it I see or hear in the life of men which ought not to be spoken abroad I will not divulge
as recommending that all such should be kept secret." The AMA similarly values physician confidenti-
ality. The AMA principles state,
A physician may not reveal the confidences entrusted to him in the course of medical attendance, or
the deficiencies he may observe in the character of patients, unless he is required to do so by law or
unless it becomes necessary in order to protect the welfare of the individual or of the community.
AM. MED. ASS'N, PRINCIPLES OF MED. ETHICS § 9 (1957). "The patient has the right to confidentiality.
The physician should not reveal confidential communications or information without the consent of the
patient, unless provided for by law or by the need to protect the welfare of the individual or the public
interest." AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Aff., Fundamental Elements of the Patient-Physician
Relationship, in CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WiTH ANNOTATIONS, xliii (1996).
49 See Home v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824 (Ala. 1974) (physician liable for breach of confidentiality
based on the theory of breach of implied contract); Martin v. Baehler, No. Civ. A. No. 91 C- 11-008,
1993 WL 258843 (Del. Super. Ct. 1993) (physician liable for breach of confidentiality when physician's
employee disclosed patient's pregnancy to her grandmother, mother, and step-father); MacDonald v.
Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (psychiatrist liable for breach of confidentiality when
he disclosed intimate details about his patient, discovered in therapy sessions, to his patient's wife).
50 See, eg., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-36-135 (West 1998) (physicians must report to the police
or sheriff gunshot wounds, powder bums, injury caused by a knife, or any other injury which the physi-
cian believes was intentionally inflicted); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:4-15 (West 1996) (physician must report
a patient with a communicable disease to the State Department of Health within 12 hours). See also Illi-
nois' Elder Abuse Demonstration Project Act, 320 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 15/3-4 (West 1996).
51 See, e-g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 24, § 1762 (1975-1996):
Reports of treatment of certain wounds, injuries, poisonings, or other conditions.
(a) Every physician attending or treating a stab wound, poisoning by other than accidental
means, or a case of bullet wounds, gunshot wounds, powder bums or other injury arising from or
caused by the discharge of a gun, pistol or other firearm or whenever such case is treated in a hos-
pital, sanitarium or other institution, the manager, superintendent or other person in charge shall
report such case as soon as possible to the appropriate police authorities where such physician,
hospital, sanitarium, or institution is located. This section shall not apply to such wounds, bums,
poisonings or injuries received by a member of the armed forces of the United States or the State
while engaged in the actual performance of duty. Whoever fails to make such report shall be fined
no less than $25.
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ever, that the law's explicit grant of immunity reflects the fact that, but for
the law's intervention, these disclosures would be impermissible violations
of the physician's duty of loyalty to his or her patient.
The issue of fiduciary obligation becomes murkier in cases in which
the disclosure is not mandated, but rather discretionary. The most common
example of this occurs when the physician perceives a "duty to warn" a
third party, whose well being appears to be threatened by his or her patient.
Beginning with the Tarasoff case in 1968, which held a psychotherapist li-
able for failing to warn a known third party that his patient had threatened
to harm her, doctors have struggled for guidance on how to balance these
competing obligations. Indeed, there is a rich literature discussing the ethi-
cal and legal ramifications of a duty to warn. 2 To date, however, there is
little consensus on the criteria for determining, in the absence of mandatory
reporting laws, what circumstances justify a physician's disclosure of a pa-
tient's confidential medical information to a third party.53 In such cases,
disclosure may bring with it a valid accusation of breach of fiduciary duty,
and the best legal advice to the physician may well be to "pick your law-
suit": a breach-of-confidentiality action brought by the patient, or a failure-
to-warn action brought by the subsequently injured third party. 4
(b) Any physician or other person who makes a report pursuant to this section shall be im-
mune from an award of damages, providing such physician or other person acted in good faith
without malice.
52 See, e-g., Bernard Friedland, HIV Confidentiality and the Right to Warn-The Health Care Pro-
vider's Dilemma, 80 MASS. L. REv. 3 (1995); Timothy E. Gammon & John K. Hulston, The Duty of
Mental Health Care Providers to Restrain Their Patients or Warn Third Parties, 60 Mo. L. REv. 749(1995); Christine E. Stenger, Taking Tarasoff Where No One Has Gone Before: Looking at 'Duty to
Warn' Under the AIDS Crisis, 15 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 471 (1996); Jake Taylor, Sex Lies, and
Lawsuits: A New Mexico Physician's Duty to Warn Third Parties Who Unknowingly May Be at Risk of
Contracting HIVfrom a Patient, 26 N.M. L. REV. 481,481-83 (1996).
53 For example, it remains uncertain whether a doctor legally can warn the spouse of an HIV-
infected patient who is unwilling either to advise her of his serostatus or to take precautions not to place
her at risk. See Friedland, supra note 52. In fact, many states, such as New Mexico, have mandated
both a duty to warn third parties at risk and to keep HIV-related information confidential. See Taylor,
supra note 52, at 481-83. Faced with conflicting statutes, physicians are forced to decide on a case-by-
case basis to whom their legal duty lies. See Friedland, supra note 52; Taylor, supra note 52, at 481-83.
54 Using the scenario raised in the previous note, the choice of lawsuits may not be terribly difficult.Realistically, the patient who complains that the doctor breached a fiduciary duty by divulging informa-
tion in an attempt to save his spouse's life is not a particularly attractive plaintiff. (My thanks to Mr. Ed
Goldman, University of Michigan Hospital Attorney, for his sage advice regarding a pragmatic approach
to this dilemma.) Indeed, although courts have recognized a patient's right to confidentiality in such
situations, it is offset by the provider's competing interests in protecting others. For example, in a case
involving an HIV-infected surgeon, the court upheld the medical center's policy of immediately sus-
pending privileges and requiring the doctor to divulge his HIV status to all surgical patients. However,
the court simultaneously found that the hospital had breached the doctor's right to confidentiality by
failing to take "reasonable precautions regarding [his] ... medical records to prevent [his]... AIDS di-
agnosis from becoming a matter of public knowledge." Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton,
592 A.2d 1251, 1255 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991). This compromise ruling renders inevitable the
widespread disclosure of the patient's HIV status, and ultimately requires only that such disclosure re-
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The absence of professional consensus about the extent to which phy-
sicians must keep patient information confidential has significant implica-
tions for the doctor-patient relationship. As in cases involving a
gatekeeper's divided loyalties, patients are not informed about the limited
extent to which they can trust their physicians to keep their secrets. To be
sure, physicians' decisions to breach confidentiality in order to protect a
third party generally carry with them a profound moral justification. Al-
though this makes the breach of the patient's trust more palatable as a mat-
ter of justice, it nevertheless remains a breach. And, as in the case of gate-
keeper divided loyalties, the absence of fiduciary standards not only dupes
patients into believing they can trust their doctors, but also limits their abil-
ity to bring a claim against their doctors when a betrayal of that trust occurs.55
3. Divided Loyalties and the Patient's Right to Autonomy. The pa-
tient's right to autonomy is, at least on its face, wholly consistent with the
physician's fiduciary duty, in that the physician's sole obligation is to pur-
sue the patient's well-being in accordance with the patient's wishes. In re-
ality, however, the patient's right to provide an informed consent or refusal
to any proposed treatment creates conflict for the physician who firmly be-
lieves that a particular treatment would be beneficial. In order to under-
stand these conflicts as challenges to fiduciary duty, it is important to
review the strength of the patient's right to autonomy as it has evolved over
the course of the past hundred years.
a. The Patient's Right to Autonomy and the Law of Informed
Consent.--The patient's right to control medical access to his or her body
evolved gradually through twentieth-century common-law decisions. The
first cases to articulate a patient's right to be free of unwanted medical
treatment involved physicians who treated patients successfully, but failed
to secure the patient's consent prior to treatment. The courts found that
suit not from inappropriate access to medical records, but rather from explicit notice given by the in-
fected individual, or from indirect' otice" signaled by a sudden suspension of staff privileges.
55 This may not seem particularly heart-rending in the case of the secretly HIV-infected spouse.
However, the balance shifts if we imagine a doctor who elects to inform an unwitting husband of his
wife's extramarital affair, or to tell a teenage patient's parents of her sexual activity. Recent case law
governing breach of confidentiality demonstrates some limits on the law's tolerance of the release of
medical information in the name of "protecting" third parties. For example, a family physician was
found liable for releasing information regarding his patient's mental health to her ex-husband, with
whom the patient was involved in a child custody dispute. See McCormick v. England, 494 $.E.2d 431,
432 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997). In another case, a plastic surgeon was found liable after displaying a cosmetic
surgery patient's "before" and "after" photographs in a department store presentation and on television.
Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, 492 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1985). For two interesting discussions of this line of
cases, see Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients from Their Physicians, 55
U. PITT. L. REv. 291 (1994), and Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82
COLUM. L. REv. 1426 (1982).
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such treatment constituted battery and permitted the patients to recover
damages against the physicians despite the successful outcomes. 6
The notion that treatment without consent constituted battery was a
critical step in establishing patients' unequivocal right to control access to
their bodies. Initially, however, it had only a limited impact on patients'
experiences of autonomy in their routine encounters with doctors. In order
to avoid battery charges, physicians needed only to obtain a patient's writ-
ten consent prior to rendering treatment. Thus, doctors developed generic
consent forms, which served to eliminate claims of battery, but failed to
provide the patient with an opportunity to give a meaningful consent to
treatment. Indeed, the consent form became a "take it or leave it" proposi-
tion, so that a patient who wanted treatment had no alternative but to sign
away her autonomy rights.
As a result of this limitation, the law attempted to fill the hollow
autonomy right by requiring doctors to provide patients with sufficient in-
formation about any proposed medical treatment prior to obtaining consent.
This effort is reflected in the series of decisions giving rise to the patient's
right to make an informed consent to treatment. Beginning in the 1950s,
courts found that treating patients without first informing them of the risks,
benefits, and alternatives to treatment constituted negligence. 7 As with the
earlier battery cases, patients' actual experiences of informed consent vary.58
Nevertheless, the right to make an informed consent establishes with utter
certainty the principle that doctors may not impose medical treatment upon
their patients, even if they believe such treatment to be in the patient's best
interests, unless and until the patient permits the doctor to do so.59
56 See Pratt v. Davis, 118 I. App. 161 (Ill. App. Ct. 1905) (awarding punitive damages for removal
of patient's vital organs without consent), aft'd, 79 N.E. 562 (1h1. 1906); Schloendorfv. Society ofN. Y.
Hasp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (recognizing the right to bodily integrity).
57 See, eg., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (permitting claims by plaintiffs
who argued that, had they understood the risk of this particular bad outcome, they never would have
consented to treatment); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960). See generally PAUL S.
APPELBAUM, INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE (1987); JAY KATz, THE
SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).
58 Physicians often see informed consent as a technicality, a task to be taken care of after they havedecided what to do. This is reflected in a phrase the chief of medical ethics at the University of Utah
School of Medicine often hears in the hallways: "I'm going to go in and get consent." Flora Johnson
Skelly, The Payoffoflnformed Consent, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 1, 1994, at 13. See also KATZ, supra
note 57; Jay Katz, Informed Consent-Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 69 (1994) (arguing that emphasis on disclosure will enhance patient decision-making autonomy,
which historically has been neglected); Daniel P. Sulmasy et al., Patients' Perception of the Quality of
Informed Consent for Common Medical Procedures, 5 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 189 (1994) (discussions
between doctors and patients when consent is obtained are more formal than substantive); Peter H.
Shuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 917 (1994) (state disclosure laws vary). For
an analysis of the particularly problematic nature of informed consent in the obstetric realm, see Nancy
K. Rhoden, Informed Consent in Obstetrics: Some Special Problems, 9 W. NEw ENG. L REv. 67 (1987).
59 Note that this right has a basis in constitutional law as well as in common law. Indeed the entire
line of decisions invoking a right to die by the withdrawal of life support is predicated upon a Fourteenth
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The central element of informed consent is the physician's duty to disclose
relevant information to the patient Because the information regarding diagno-
sis and course of action is otherwise inaccessible to the patient, the patient must
rely upon the physician as fiduciary to convey the relevant information in an
accessible manner. Informed consent thus represents one of the few areas in
which physicians' fiduciary obligations are relatively well articulated.
At least at the aspirational level, physicians have embraced the notion
of an autonomy right for patients. The American Medical Association's
ethical and policy guidelines advocate unambiguous support for the right to
refuse treatment, even in cases in which refusal means that the patient likely
will die for want of a simple medical procedure such as a transfusion. 6°
Nevertheless, because physicians are trained to diagnose, treat, and when-
ever possible, cure human ailments, the recognition of a patient's right to
refuse medical treatment inherently poses an ethical challenge. 6' By defini-
tion, physicians trained in the art and science of healing cannot be entirely
comfortable with patients' autonomous decisions to reject medical advice.
The best evidence of this discomfort is the long line of cases arising out of
doctors' efforts to compel their patients to accept medical treatment. One
way to evaluate the role of fiduciary duty in this context is to examine what
happens when doctors' ethical injunctions to heal meet with conflicting pa-
tient assertions of a right to be free of unwanted medical treatment.
b. The Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment Intended for Own
Benefit.-As recently as 1972, courts permitted doctors to impose unwanted
treatment upon competent adult patients when such treatment was necessary
to save the patient's life. For example, in the case of Dolores Heston, the
New Jersey Supreme Court found that a relatively simple treatment of
blood transfusions would return the otherwise dying patient to complete
health, and the court therefore rejected the notion that the patient had a right
to refuse treatment.62 Central to the court's holding was its concern about
the impact on physicians of a patient's refusal of treatment:
Amendment right to liberty or privacy. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Washington v. Glucks-
berg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In re Quinlan,
355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
60 COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFF., AM. MED. ASS'N CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS-
CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS, § 8.08, at 134-35 (1998-1999 ed. 1998) [hereinafter CODE OF
ETHICS]. Courts have cited this rule in upholding a patient's right to refuse life-saving treatment. See In
re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989); In re Brooks Estate, 205 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. 1965); In re Fetus Brown,
689 N.E.2d 397 (IIl. App. Ct. 1997).
61 The physician's training, experience, and technological capability all militate against respecting
the patient's wishes. In the physician's eyes, particularly in the case of relatively minor treatment, al-
lowing the curable to go uncured is unjustifiable, and engenders feelings of helplessness and frustration.
Jeffrey P. Phelan, Symposium on Biomedical Technology and Health Care: Social and Conceptual
Transformations: Technical Article: The Maternal Abdominal Wall: A Fortress Against Fetal Health
Care?, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 461,471 (1991).
62 John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp. v. Heston, 279 A.2d 670 (N.J. 1971).
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A surgeon should not be asked to operate under the strain of knowing that
a transfusion may not be administered even though medically required to save
his patient .... Miss Heston's family made no effort to take her elsewhere ....
When the hospital and staff are thus involuntary hosts and their interests are
pitted against the belief of the patient, we think it reasonable to resolve the
problem by permitting the hospital and its staff to pursue their functions ac-
cording to their professional standards.63
Cases decided over the course of the past several decades have rendered
that position almost completely obsolete. Beginning with the Quinlan case,
the same court predicated an incompetent patient's right to die upon the
claim that competent patients had a constitutional privacy right that em-
powered them to refuse unwanted treatment.64 Years later, the U.S. Su-
preme Court echoed this position, citing in dicta a liberty interest in being
free from unwanted medical care.65 So powerful is this right that several
cases have extended it to minor patients. 6 So extensive is the support for
this right that my research does not reveal a single case after 1972 in which
a competent patient was forced to undergo medical treatment intended
strictly for her own benefit.
c. The Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment Intended to
Benefit Another.-It is clear that the doctor's fiduciary duty requires him to
honor his patient's refusal of treatment, even though so doing conflicts with
his medical training and his ethical obligation to save life. This outcome
remains essentially unchanged in the related autonomy conflict that arises
when patients refuse treatment that the physician believes would be benefi-
cial for a third party.
63 Id. at 673.
64 Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663.
65 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278. The Court narrowly defined the issue as whether the State of Missouri,
in keeping with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, could ignore one's liberty inter-
est in every case except those in which the patient had left clear and convincing evidence of her desire to
have life-prolonging treatment withdrawn. Id. at 280-81. However, the Court assumed, for purposes of
its decision, that an individual has a "liberty interest" in having life-prolonging treatment withdrawn.
"The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing un-
wanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.' Id. at 278.
66 See In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 327-28 (Il1. 1989). The court stated:
If the evidence is clear and convincing that the minor is mature enough to appreciate the conse-
quences of her actions, and that the minor is mature enough to exercise the judgment of an adult, then
the mature minor doctrine affords her the common law right to consent to or refuse medical treatment.
Id. See also Cardwell v. Brechter, 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987) (adopting mature minor exception to
common-law rule requiring parental consent); In re Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 557 N.Y.S.2d 239
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (holding that there is much merit to the "mature minor" doctrine and that the New
York legislature should address the issue). For a critique of the extension of the right to refuse treatment
to minors, see Michelle Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 127-38 (1996).
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The effort to impose treatment on a patient in order to benefit another
represents an instance of divided loyalties similar to that raised when doc-
tors consider breaching confidentiality in order to benefit a third party. For
the most part, these conflicts arise infrequently, litigation is scarce, and,
outside of the context of pregnancy, the law simply will not countenance
such actions. The law's intolerance of such a request is illustrated by the
powerful dicta in the one frequently cited case on this topic, McFall v.
Shimp. 67 This case involved a man dying of aplastic anemia who sued his
cousin. The cousin agreed to undergo preliminary testing for bone marrow
compatibility, but, after the test indicated that he was a suitable bone mar-
row donor, he declined further testing or donation. In upholding the
cousin's right to refuse donation, the court invoked "the sanctity of the in-
dividual" and emphasized that to force the cousin to donate would "change
every concept and principle upon which our society is founded.s 68
Doctors' responses to situations in which treatment of one patient might
yield a benefit for another are limited not so much by fear of the law as by
ethical injunctions against perpetrating intentional medical harm. Two areas
in which conflicts between multiple patients arise include live-donor tissue
transplantation and nontherapeutic research.69 The stakes are high in these
situations. For instance, the physician's failure to intervene with a patient's
family members in an effort to help the patient find a kidney transplant may
well lead to the worsening of the patient's condition. Nonetheless, if the
physician does coerce a family member into becoming a donor, the donor
will suffer harm "directly and exclusively from medical intervention. 70
Standard medical practice in these cases prohibits such intervention.
As Professor Susan Mattingly explains, the policy against physician inter-
vention reflects the Hippocratic tradition, which presumes that the only jus-
tification for physician-caused harm to a patient is therapeutic intent for that
patient. Indeed, "a professional ethics that allowed treatment recommenda-
tions to be based on... therapeutic intent for others... would erode the fi-
duciary character of the physician-patient relationship, undermining the
basis for patients' trust."71 Just beneath the surface of these cases is evi-
dence of the cognitive dissonance that physicians experience in relation to
issues of patient autonomy. Although they might embrace the norm of pa-
tient autonomy and feel legally and ethically bound to effectuate it, it is
nonetheless true that doctors experience conflicting ethical impulses when
67 McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Allegheny County Ct. 1978).
61 L at 91.
69 See, eg., ExPERIMENTATioN WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS (Paul A. Freund ed., 1970); LAW & ETHICS
OF TRANSPLANTATION (Gordon Wolstenholme & Maeve O'Connor eds., 1966); ROBERT J. LEVINE,
ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH (1981); ROBERTA G. SIMMONS et. al., GIFT OF LIFE:
THE SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION (1977).
70 Susan Mattingly, The Maternal-Fetal Dyad: Exploring the Two-Patient Obstetric Model, 22
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 13, 15 (1992).
71 Id.
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their patients refuse treatment. It is also true that physicians' will to pre-
serve and promote health can clash with their obligation to honor their pa-
tients' autonomy.72 Given the deeply felt nature of this conflict, it is
actually quite remarkable that there are not myriad contexts in which physi-
cians attempt to impose treatment on unconsenting patients. And yet, no
matter how vigorously they may oppose the patient's decision, in virtually
every context but one, doctors no longer assert a right to force care upon a
conscious, competent patient who has refused to consent to treatment.73
It is only in the context of pregnancy that doctors assert the right to
compel their patients to heed medical advice. Doctors' responses to their
pregnant patients therefore emerge as a startling exception to the nearly
universal consensus that patients, not doctors, should control determinations
about whether and when to undergo medical treatment. Because doctors as-
sert the right, if not the duty, to intervene when pregnant women reject
medical advice, maternal-doctor conflict cases represent the critical test of
the meaning, and the true limits, of doctors' fiduciary duty to their patients.
Part I provides a detailed discussion of maternal-doctor conflicts, paying
special attention to the doctors' role in generating these conflicts.
III. MATERNAL-DOCTOR CONFLICT AS BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY:
THE RATIONALIZATION AND TWO CASE STUDIES
Doctors do not deny that they employ a different standard when treat-
ing pregnant women. On the contrary, they readily acknowledge it, con-
tending that pregnant patients must be viewed differently from other
patients because there are "two lives involved."74 The argument that preg-
nancy is sui generis, and therefore should be governed by distinct legal and
ethical principles, is neither new nor unique to medicine. Indeed, feminists
72 See Phelan, supra note 61, at 472 (describing the difficulty physicians experience when patients
ask them to allow the curable to go uncured).
73 For example, Edward H. Winters, an Ohio man, filed suit, claiming negligence and battery, against a
hospital for resuscitating him in spite of his "do not resuscitate" order. Patient Suing Hospital for Sav-
ingHis Life, 31 MED. WORLD NEWS 8 (Apr. 23, 1990). Although Winters was in good health following
the successful resuscitation effort, he argued that the hospital overrode his explicit wishes regarding the
most fundamental decision of all: whether to live or die. See id. InBartling v. Glendale Adventist Medi-
cal Center, 229 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), a man tried to remove his ventilator tubes (after his
repeated requests for their removal were ignored). Id. at 361. The hospital used soft restraints and close
supervision to restrain him. Id. at 363. Although the court held that a "competent non-terminally ill
adult patient has a right to reject and/or terminate medical treatment," it simultaneously exonerated the
hospital by emphasizing their "good faith." Id. at 366. This slippage reflects the court's deference to
the hospital's "good efforts" and disregard of the patient's autonomy rights. For a probing and provoca-
tive analysis of the issue of forced treatment from a variety of perspectives and scholarly fields, see
DAX'S CASE: ESSAYS IN MEDICAL ETHICS AND HUMAN MEANING (Lonnie Kliever ed., 1989).
74 J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS VII (16th ed. 1980) ("Happily, we
have entered an era in which the fetus can be rightfully considered and treated as our second patient.");
Femand Daffos, Access to the Other Patient, 13 SEMINARS IN PERINATOLOGY 252 (1989); Finer, supra
note 8, at 283-84. For a critique of the construction of the two-patient model, see Mattingly, supra note 70.
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and others have raised this argument in contexts ranging from the employ-
75 7ment setting, to efforts to secure women's rights to abortion. 6 This argu-
ment takes place against the broader backdrop of the debate over formal
versus substantive equality. Proponents of formal equality argue that the
road to women's equality lies in treating women the same as men, while
proponents of substantive equality argue that doing so eclipses key realities
of women's lives, thereby perpetuating women's subordinate social status.77
In the context of pregnancy, this debate is framed as a struggle over the
extent to which the fact of a pregnancy might legitimate subjecting pregnant
women to a distinct set of rules, rights, and privileges. In legal terms, this
devolves into a debate over the extent to which pregnancy should be viewed
as a disabling condition. To the extent that the latter view prevails, pregnant
women will be afforded greater deference and accommodation under the law.78
75 For example, the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions on pregnancy-based discrimination began with
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that a company's failure to pay disability benefits for
pregnancy was not discrimination on the basis of sex), and continued through International Union, UAW
v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (holding that Title VII forbids sex-specific fetal protections).
For a thorough, yet concise summary of this line of cases prior to Johnson Controls, the Congressional
response to the issue, and the difficulty pregnancy poses to advocates of formal equality, see Mary E.
Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1219 (1986).
76 See, eg., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
Abortion is a unique act .... Though abortion is conduct, it does not follow that the State is
entitled to proscribe it in all instances. That is because the liberty of the woman is at stake in a
sense unique to the human condition and so unique to the law. The mother who carries a child to
full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear.... Her
suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the
woman's role, however dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and our culture.
Id.
77 See generally MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 41-43 (1990) (the law's official neutrality treats women like men but leaves women to
shoulder the burdens created by differences); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1007-13 (1984) (arguing that laws governing reproductive biology be scrutinized by
courts to ensure they do not perpetuate gender stereotypes or the oppression of women). Regarding
abortion, see Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation
and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 357-58 (1992), who writes:
A legislature's purpose in enacting restrictions on abortion is to pressure or compel women to
carry a pregnancy to term which they would otherwise terminate .... Motherhood is the role upon
which this society has traditionally predicated "gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes."
Thus, the objective of abortion-restrictive regulation is to force women to assume the role and per-
form the work that has traditionally defined their secondary social status.
Id. Regarding equality in the workplace, see Mary Joe Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor
Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L. REV. 55, 58 (1979) ("As long as the labor market is
hostile to parents, and as long as roles in the American family continue to be allocated on the basis of
gender, the labor market gap between the sexes will continue.").
78 This debate was central to the Supreme Court's decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125 (1976), in which the court held that the exclusion of pregnancy from an insurance plan was not
a pretext for discrimination against women, but rather, was a reflection of the fact that, unlike other cov-
ered illnesses, pregnancy was not a disease. Id. at 136. Two years later, the United States Congress re-
jected this view by passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994),
which amended Title VII specifically to forbid discrimination on the basis of "pregnancy, childbirth or
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There is a critical distinction, however, between these ongoing debates
about pregnancy's uniqueness and the debates generated by physicians
seeking to justify imposing treatment on pregnant women. Unlike the de-
bates over whether, in the name of equality, pregnant women should be
treated the same as their male (and nonpregnant female) counterparts or in-
stead have more rights than their male counterparts, doctors are proposing
that, in the name of pregnancy, women should havefewer rights than do their
male counterparts. This argument represents a legally and ethically obsolete
premise, reminiscent of the sex-specific protectionist policies of the latter
half of the nineteenth century and the early decades of this century. 79 It is
an approach that, over the course of the past forty years, has been over-
whelmingly rejected as an impermissible violation of women's legal rights.80
The claim that pregnant patients must be accorded fewer rights than
other patients because there are two lives involved is wholly unpersuasive
as a justification for abandoning the fundamental principles of patient
autonomy and doctors' fiduciary obligations to their patients. And yet, as
will be seen in this Part's exploration of two examples of maternal-doctor
conflict, doctors' rationalization that the fetus is their "second patient" con-
stitutes their sole justification for subordinating the interests of their preg-
nant patients to their own vision of the fetus's best interests.
A. The Rationalization: The Fetus as a "Second Patient"
At first blush, it seems rather logical to reason that, because of the fe-
tus's presence, pregnant women are different from other patients, and that,
as a result, doctors might treat their pregnant patients differently from other
patients. It is self-evident that only pregnant patients have fetuses inside of
them and that doctors must recognize that any treatment they render poten-
tially affects both the pregnant woman and her fetus. Yet there is little logic
justifying the leap from acknowledging the fetus's presence to severely
curtailing the autonomy rights of pregnant women.
In large part, the leap from acknowledging the fetus's presence to lim-
iting the pregnant woman's autonomy is a reflection of the medical com-
related medical conditions. . ." and to require that "women affected by pregnancy [or] childbirth" be
treated "the same for all employment-related purposes .. as other persons not so affected .... " A
more recent incarnation of this debate takes place in the context of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
which has been interpreted to exclude pregnancy from coverage. See Colette G. Matzzie, Note, Sub-
stantive Equality and Antidiscrimination: Accommodating Pregnancy Under the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act, 82 GEO. L.J. 193 (1993). But see Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2207 (1998)
(holding that reproduction is a "major life activity.").
79 See Becker, supra note 75, at 1221-24 (noting that ostensibly protectionist legislation tended to view
all women "only in terms of the biologic and domestic responsibilities associated with motherhood").
80 The beginning of the end of sex-specific subordination of women's rights came with the passage
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, in 1964. For a summary of the twentieth century's history of the
legal challenges and reforms in the arena of sexual discrimination, see CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON
ACCOUNT OF SEx (1988); JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE (1991).
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munity's response to technological advances such as ultrasound, which
permits obstetricians to visualize the fetus within the mother's uterus.
Many authors have noted how this technology has altered medical practice,
substituting doctors' traditional reliance on the mother for information with
the power "to see, examine and invade the fetus and its environment" di-
rectly. 81 The result, as one widely cited medical text concludes, is that
"[t]he fetus is no longer dealt with as a maternal appendage ultimately to be
shed, but has achieved the status of a second patient who faces greater risks
of serious morbidity and mortality than does the mother."82
It is imperative to note, however, that the mere fact that a fetus can be
visualized provides neither a legal nor an ethical foundation for the notion that
the fetus is the obstetrician's "second patient," still less one whose interests
trump those of the "first patient," the pregnant woman. Like all doctor-patient
relationships, relationships between pregnant patients and their doctors are es-
tablished when a woman seeks treatment from a doctor. Patients, or their
guardians, initiate relationships with doctors. Absent a patient or guardian's
consent, a doctor has no power to adopt an individual as a patient
This applies with equal force to adults and to minors, as relationships
between children and their doctors are predicated upon the child's parent or
guardian consenting to such treatment. As a result, even if a doctor sus-
pects that a minor is in need of medical care, the doctor cannot initiate a
health care relationship with the minor, but rather must report the child to a
state agency charged with investigating possible instances of medical ne-
glect.84 The doctor's act of filing such a report in no way creates a doctor-
patient relationship between himself and the child.
81 F.A. Manning, Reflections on Future Directions of Perinatal Medicine, 13 SEMINARS IN
PERNATOLOGY 342,343 (1989).
82 F. GARY CUNNINGHAM, M.D. ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 1031 (19th ed. 1993). There is a
rich literature discussing and critiquing the construction of the fetus as second patient. See, e-g.,
LAURENCE B. MCCULLOUGH & FRANK A. CHERVENAK, ETHICS IN OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY (2d
ed.1996); Frank A. Chervenak & Laurence B. McCullough, Ethical Issues in Recommending and Of-
fering Fetal Therapy, 159 W.J. MED. 396 (Sept. 1993); Mattingly, supra note 71; Joan C. Callahan,
First Steps in Preventative Ethics, HASTINGS CENTER REPT., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 45 (reviewing
LAURENCE B. MCCULLOUGH, ETHICS IN OBSTETICS AND GYNECOLOGY (1994)).
83 The common-law position regarding health care treatment for minors was that, until reaching the
age of majority, minors lacked the legal authority to consent to their own care. Thus, any treatment ren-
dered to a minor absent parental consent could subject the health care provider to an action by the par-
ents for assault and battery. ANGELA RODDY HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT
MEDICINE 124-25 (1985); Walter Wadlington, Minors andHealth Care: The Age of Consent, II OSGOOD
HALL LJ. 115 (1973). In recent decades, mature minor laws have provided several exceptions to this
rule, permitting minors to consent to their own health care in certain narrowly defined circumstances.
For a brief discussion of these laws, see Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-Evaluating
Modern Statutory Rape Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 46-53 (1994). See also supra note 65,
84 See, eg., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West 1998):
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), any child care custodian, health practitioner, em-
ployee of a child protective agency, child visitation monitor, firefighter, animal control officer, or
humane society officer who has knowledge of or observes a child, in his or her professional capac-
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Therefore, absent the pregnant woman's consent, her doctor has no
more right to adopt the fetus as his "second" patient than he does to make
any of her other living children, or even her husband, his patient. Indeed,
because the fetus lacks legal status, the doctor arguably has less right to ini-
tiate a doctor-patient relationship with the fetus than he would with these
other family members. 85
In spite of this, beginning in the mid-twentieth century, the medical
profession rapidly adopted the vision of the fetus as a medically vulnerable
second patient, trapped within its mother's womb.86  The practical conse-
quence of this has been the advent of "conflicts" that are deemed to exist
whenever the pregnant woman resists or rejects medical advice.87 A 1987
study documents the medical community's widespread support for the
doctor's right to identify these conflicts and to impose the "appropriate"
treatment on the recalcitrant pregnant woman.88 This study surveyed sev-
enty-six current heads of fellowship programs and found that forty-six per-
cent of the respondents thought mothers who endangered their fetuses' lives
by refusing to comply with medical advice should be detained in a hospital
until compliance. 89  Forty-seven percent thought that the legal precedent
permitting emergency cesarean sections when the fetus was endangered
should also include other procedures that may be lifesaving for the fetus.90
ity or within the scope of his or her employment, whom he or she knows or reasonably suspects
has been the victim of child abuse, shall report the known or suspected instance of child abuse to a
child protective agency immediately or as soon as practically possible by telephone and shall pre-
pare and send a written report thereof within 36 hours of receiving the information concerning the
incident.
85 This is because of a relatively long line of recent cases holding that fetuses are not covered under
child abuse statutes. See Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 219 (1977); In re Valerie D.,
613 A.2d 748, 760 (Conn. 1992) (court found the statutory definition of "child" is limited to a person
who has been born); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992) (holding that the state child abuse stat-
ute does not apply when a mother abuses drugs during her pregnancy); Wisconsin ex reL Angela M. W.
v. Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729, 740 (Wis. 1997) (holding that the definition of child under the child pro-
tection statute does not include a viable fetus). See also Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992)
(holding that women who use drugs during their pregnancy cannot be prosecuted under criminal statutes
prohibiting the delivery of a controlled substance to a child). But see Whitner v. South Carolina, 492
S.E.2d 777, 779 (S.C. 1997) (finding that a fetus is a person holding certain rights and privileges under
South Carolina law).
86 See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 82. See also Mattingly, supra note 70.
87 Another practical consequence has been the revised nomenclature surrounding obstetric practice.
Originally, doctors interested in treating pregnancy specialized in obstetrics and gynecology, a field that
involved the treatment of female patients for reproductive health care over the course of their lifetimes.
They served on hospital staffs, within departments of obstetrics and gynecology. In the last decades of
the twentieth century, these departments, and the doctors who work within them, began changing their
names. Now it is common to refer pregnant women to departments of "maternal-fetal medicine," in
which they might be treated by "maternal-fetal experts," or perhaps even by a "fetal medicine specialist."
as Kolder, supra note 6.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 1193.
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Finally, only twenty-four percent believed the decision of a competent
pregnant patient to refuse treatment should be upheld.9'
In order to understand the startlingly anomalous nature of these doctor-
generated conflicts, imagine that an internist is treating a patient for a heart
condition. Over the course of time, the doctor comes to believe that the pa-
tient, who is a middle-aged, overweight, married father of two minor chil-
dren, is abusing alcohol. The doctor is familiar not only with the medical
literature demonstrating the potentially fatal impact of excess alcohol con-
sumption on obese patients with heart conditions, but also with the consid-
erable literature documenting the devastating consequences of parental
alcoholism on families. Now imagine the doctor taking any of the actions
that have become commonplace in the treatment of pregnant women. Can
you imagine the doctor obtaining a court order requiring that the patient be
confined in an alcohol detoxification center? Can you imagine the doctor
reporting the patient to the criminal justice authorities? Can you imagine
the doctor deeming the patient's children his "second patients" and peti-
tioning a court to appoint a guardian to consent to their removal from the
family's home? Can you even imagine the doctor testing the patient for the
presence of alcohol without his express consent?92
There are at best two plausible legal justifications for curtailing auton-
omy rights in cases involving pregnant women and fetuses in ways that
would be impermissible in cases involving the parents of living children.
The first stems from a belief that the state has an overriding interest in safe-
guarding fetal well-being. Proponents of this view argue that the line of
Supreme Court decisions governing abortion establish a state interest in
protecting the viable fetus.
For example, a recent law review article attempting to justify the com-
pulsory treatment of pregnant women begins with the attribution of legal
rights to viable fetuses in certain circumstances, including the abortion
context.93 The author concedes that these cases do not address the issue of
whether fetuses have legal rights as against their mothers in general, but
claims that, "because a cesarean involves a verge-of-birth fetus, one can
reasonably argue that this fetus should have the rights of a born person. 9 4
The author's only justification for eliding the line between fetus and human
being, a line etched brightly into law, medicine, and simple human experi-
ence, is his unsupported claim that "[tihe medical profession places no
greater emphasis on the health of a newborn than it does on the healthy
91 Id. Thirty-seven percent actually answered this question in the affirmative; however, seven of the
twenty respondents who advocated this also supported state surveillance of third trimester pregnant
women who refuse to stay in the hospital when medically advised.
92 1 am indebted to Dr. Michael Newdow for his assistance with this hypothetical dilemma.
93 Finer, supra note 8, at 247-50.
94 Id. at 270.
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birth of a fetus."95 The author then appends a handful of supporting argu-
ments, ranging from a border-line absurd claim that, because cesarean sec-
tions are commonplace, they need not be considered invasive, to the wholly
unfounded assertion that, once the time for a lawful abortion has passed, the
mother implicitly undertakes an obligation to "bring [the fetus] to life in as
healthy a condition as she can ....')9F
The author himself acknowledges the weaknesses of each of his
claims, noting that "the argument [in favor of compulsory cesareans] is ad-
mittedly somewhat less than compelling. 97 Then, in a stunning display of
irrationality, he concludes that, in spite of the fact that "each component of
my argument may be 'distinguishable,' the whole is greater than the sum of
its parts." In short, his claim is that, by weighing all of his losing argu-
ments together, one can muster enough support to justify the compulsory
treatment of pregnant women!
98
The logical flaw in the arguments justifying the curtailment of preg-
nant women's autonomy rights lies in reading an expansive affirmative duty
into the abortion cases, which limit third trimester abortions to cases of medi-
cal necessity. Roe and its progeny, however, stand only for the proposition
that, at the point of viability, the State's interest in fetal life becomes suffi-
ciently compelling to permit a state to prohibit all abortions, save those nec-
essary to preserve the pregnant woman's life and health.99 In no way do
95 Id. at 256.
96 Id. at 259. Contrary to Finer's belief, a cesarean section is major abdominal surgery regardless of
the commonality of the procedure. For a vivid description of a cesarean section, see MICHELLE
HARRISON, A woMAN IN RESIDENCE 81-84 (1982), quoted in Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions and
Interventions: What's Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 9, 35-36 (1987). In addition,
the notion that a woman implicitly undertakes an obligation to "bring [the fetus] to life in as healthy a
condition as she can.. ." is completely unsupported. Indeed, even a cursory analysis of this issue must
recognize that because the individual's rights to autonomy and liberty are fundamental, they cannot be
"implicitly" waived. For a more detailed critique of the "implicit waiver" proposition, see Michelle
Oberman, Sex, Drugs, Pregnancy, and the Law: Rethinking the Problems of Pregnant Women Who Use
Drugs, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 505 (1992) (contending that, in order to be even marginally plausible, a preg-
nant woman's waiver of her autonomy rights would need to be secured early in the pregnancy. This
could be accomplished by advising the woman that, should she elect to continue the pregnancy, her
autonomy rights would be limited to those which her doctor deemed permissible).
97 Finer, supra note 8, at 271.
98 See Finer, supra note 8. Among Finer's self-proclaimed "less than compelling" arguments are
some of the following: the increased likelihood that Roe v. Wade will be altered; the treatment of late-
stage fetuses as patients by the medical profession; and the close analogy of the blood transfusion cases
in light of the relatively low risks involved in an ordinary cesarean section.
99 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992):
It must be stated at the outset and with clarity that Roe's essential holding, the holding we reaf-
firm, has three parts. First is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion
before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State .... Second is a con-
firmation of the State's power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the law contains excep-
tions for pregnancies which endanger the woman's life or health. And third is the principle that
the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the
woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.
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these cases imply that women who choose to carry their pregnancies to term
have somehow waived their fundamental constitutional rights. Nor do they
posit a broad-based interest in the viable fetus sufficient to usurp pregnant
women's right to remain free from unwanted medical treatment in all contexts.
A second seemingly plausible justification for doctors who act to limit
pregnant women's autonomy rights might be found in the law governing fi-
duciary obligation in the context of mergers and acquisitions. Specifically,
case law provides that the nature of fiduciary duties may shift in the event
of "changed circumstances.1' tee For example, in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAn-
drews and Forbes Holdings, Inc., the court held that, once the sale of the
company became inevitable, the board of directors' fiduciary duty to the
shareholders required that their goal shift from "the preservation of Revlon
as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale
for the stockholders' benefit."10' Reasoning by analogy, a physician might
argue that pregnancy constitutes a "changed circumstance," thus justifying a
shift in fiduciary duty to encompass the fetus, as well as the pregnant woman.
This analogy is fundamentally flawed. First of all, a doctor who treats
pregnant women could scarcely argue that his patient's pregnancy consti-
tutes a "change in circumstances." Both the doctor and the patient knew of
the pregnancy at the start of prenatal care, when the fiduciary relationship
between the doctor and the pregnant woman began. Instead, the doctor
would have to argue that pregnancy as such constitutes the "changed cir-
cumstance," and that fiduciary duties owed to pregnant patients always dif-
fer from those owed to non-pregnant patients. This is but a new gloss on
the old tautological justification that pregnant women merit fewer rights be-
cause they are pregnant. 0 2 Doctors cannot transform the observation that
pregnant women are different from other patients into a justification for be-
traying their patients' trust in them.
Id. The principle, as originally stated in Roe, was as follows:
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest, ... the "compelling" point.., is at
approximately the end of the first trimester... It follows that, from and after this point, a State
may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that regulation reasonably relates to the preser-
vation and protection of maternal health.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
100 These changed circumstances may arise from inside or outside of the business entity. See, e.g.,
The Mediators, Inc. v. Manney, No. 83 Civ. 2304 (CSH), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14402 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
25, 1996); Great W. Producers Coop. v. Great W. United Corp., 613 P.2d 873 (Colo. 1980); Revlon, Inc.
v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). For a discussion of the
"changed circumstances" doctrine, see Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., A Positive Analysis of the Common
Law of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 84 KY. L.. 455 (1995/1996). Campbell summarizes the common
law of fiduciary duties in recapitalizations, affiliated mergers, lockups and freeze outs as generally re-
quiring corporate managers "to make all moves in which, as a result of the move, at least one stock-
holder is better offand no stockholder is worse off." Id. at 469.
101 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
102 See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
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Secondly, even if we accept the premise that doctors bear a fiduciary
duty to pregnant patients that is distinct from the fiduciary duty they bear to
their non-pregnant patients, it is clear that this in no way authorizes them to
ignore, let alone to undermine, their duty of loyalty to their pregnant pa-
tients. Revlon's lesson is that the essence of fiduciary duty is the obligation
to protect the best interests of the dependent party. Thus, we see that, in the
event of a bidding war over a corporation, the shareholders' interests, and
therefore the fiduciary's duties, no longer lie in preserving the "corporate
bastion," but rather entail maximizing the value of the company's shares. 10 3
When the context involves choosing between the various treatment options
available to a pregnant patient, there is no objective criterion like share
value to determine what the patient's best interests are.
Likewise, even if pregnancy were viewed as a "changed circum-
stance," it at most adds additional considerations of fetal well-being to the
physician's preexisting fiduciary obligations to the pregnant woman. These
considerations should permit, if not require, that the doctor inform the
woman about issues of consequence to her fetus's welfare. However, if the
doctor attempts to impose treatment on the pregnant woman against her
will, he necessarily violates his duty of loyalty to her. The Revlon prece-
dent, to the extent that it is relevant at all, does not stand for the proposition
that, in the name of changed circumstances, a fiduciary may ignore his obli-
gations to one beneficiary in favor of another.'04
This close scrutiny demonstrates that the underlying justification for
treating pregnant patients differently from non-pregnant patients is not logi-
cal, but rather tautological: pregnant patients are different because they are
pregnant. This brings us back to where this section began-with the faulty
assumption that a doctor is entitled to dictate and impose medical treatment
upon a pregnant patient in the name of protecting the fetus. Subparts B and
C discuss two examples of this assumption in practice, helping to illustrate
its legal, ethical and practical shortcomings. I have selected these examples
because they represent the most obvious instances of maternal-doctor con-
103 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
104 Even under the most extreme construction of this broadened fiduciary duty, in which we assume
that the doctor owes duties of loyalty to both the woman and her fetus and that he is capable of deter-
mining how best to represent the fetus's best interests, the doctor could not attempt to force treatment
upon the woman. To do this would completely undermine his fiduciary obligations to her. At best, the
doctor could seek the appointment of a truly neutral third party, who would be charged with advocating
on the fetus's behalf. In such event, an additional party likely would be needed to advocate on behalf of
the pregnant woman, because the doctor's actions betray a conflict in his ability to act as her fiduciary.
This would entail a trip to court to seek an appointed "guardian" for the fetus and a guardian or lawyer
for the mother, particularly if she was unable to represent herself effectively due to her stage of preg-
nancy. And, as we know, when courts look carefully at this issue, the mother virtually always wins
these battles. See supra notes 3, 4, 6, 8-10; infra notes 119, 128, 130 (citing articles that explain andjustify women's autonomy in the event of maternal-fetal conflicts). See also In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235(D.C. App. 1990); Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397
(Ill. App. Ct. 1997); In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
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flict, in that each has been the subject of considerable publicity and wide-
spread academic scrutiny. It is crucial to remember, however, that they re-
flect not isolated phenomena, but rather variations on the broad theme of
conflicts that arise when doctors attempt to impose their treatment prefer-
ences upon their pregnant patients.
10 5
B. Court-Ordered Cesarean-Section Deliveries
Perhaps the quintessential example of a maternal-doctor conflict is the
controversy generated when a pregnant woman rejects a medically advised ce-
sarean section delivery. Writers from a host of academic and lay backgrounds
have been drawn to this high-drama scenario and have generated an abundance
of articles that attempt to articulate a just outcome to these situations. 0 6
Many have noted that U.S. rates of cesarean section births far exceed
rates of other first world nations.10 7 Moreover, these rates are not accompa-
nied by higher rates of infant survival 108 Several commentators have at-
tributed the swollen rates to factors such as U.S. doctors' drive to minimize
risk of medical malpractice,1°9 increase profits, 110 and maintain conven-
105 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text for a discussion of the spectrum of scenarios re-
flecting "maternal-doctor conflict."
106 See Kelly F. Bates, Cesarean Section Epidemic: Defining the Problem-Approaching Solutions,
4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 389 (1995); Charity Scott, Resisting the Temptation to Turn Medical Recommen-
dations into Judicial Orders: A Reconsideration of Court-Ordered Surgery for Pregnant Women, 10
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 615 (1994); Annette Williams, In re A.C.: Foreshadowing the Unfortunate Expan-
sion of Court-Ordered Cesarean Sections, 74 IOWA L. REV. 287 (1988).
107 See MARY GABAY & SIDNEY WOLFE, M.D., UNNECESSARY CESAREAN SECTIONS: CURING A
NATIONAL EPIDEMiC 24 (1994). Gabay and Wolfe present the following comparison:
Country Cesarean Section Rates per 100 Hospital Deliveries
United States 24.7
Canada 19.5
Italy 19.1
Portugal 15.8
Netherlands 15.0
Finland 13.8
Denmark 13.1
Norway 12.7
New Zealand 11.2
Sweden 11.2
United Kingdom 10.0
Czechoslovakia 7.8
1d. at 24.
10s In fact, the United States has a higher infant mortality rate than virtually any first world country.
Myron E. Wegman, Annual Summary of Vital Statistics-1990, 88 PEDIATRICS 1081, 1091 (1991).
When factoring in racial variations, the infant mortality rate for African-Americans is comparable to that
of many third world nations. Consuelo Beck Sague, Prevention of Prematurity in Black and White, Ill
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. PUBLIC HEALTH REPS. 114 (Mar. 1996).
109 See Finer, supra note 8; Hilary E. Berkman, Note, A Discussion of Medical Malpractice and Ce-
sarean Sections, 70 OR. L. REV. 629 (1991). But cf. Margaret M. Donohoe, Our Epidemic of Unneces-
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ience,111 as well as to the increased detection of problems made possible by
fetal monitoring systems."' Numerous authors have decried the interven-
tionist mindset of American medicine that drives cesarean section rates and
the resultant high costs to women 1 3 and the health-care system.' 14
In addition to demonstrating an irrational allocation of scarce health
care resources, the cesarean section phenomenon also demonstrates a clas-
sic case of breach of fiduciary duty, in which doctors become the self-
appointed mediators in conflicts they create between pregnant women and
their fetuses. When a woman resists her doctor's recommendation that she
submit to a cesarean section delivery, her doctor almost invariably will
subject her to a series of informal and formal sanctions designed to induce,
if not to coerce her into consenting to the operation. 5 It is herein that the
breach of fiduciary duty lies.
sary Cesarean Sections: The Role of the Law in Creating It, The Role of the Law in Stopping It, 11 Wis.
WOMEN'S L.J. 197, 199 (1996) (finding no convincing evidence of a causal link between malpractice
liability and the increase in cesarean sections).
110 In performing a cesarean section, as opposed to a vaginal delivery, doctors can earn 20-40%
more and hospitals can double their revenues. Jane E. Brody, Personal Health, N.Y. TIMES, July 27,
1989, at B5.
II Cesareans often are performed at 9 a.m., 5:30 p.m., and 10:30 p.m. These opportune times are
easily scheduled, coincide with the physician's rounds, and eliminate a 4 a.m. return to the hospital. See
Hilary A. Berkman, supra note 108, at n.12. See also William Fraser et al., Temporal Variation in Rates
of Cesarean Section for Dystocia: Does "Convenience" Play a Role?, 156 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 300 (1987).
112 Cf. Donohoe, supra note 108, at 199 ("Doctors are heavily dependant on technology. They ex-
pect abnormal births and respond with technological intervention.").
1 For myriad reasons, most pregnant women prefer a vaginal birth to a cesarean section delivery.Cesarean sections are more risky to the pregnant woman's health, the recovery time is lengthier and
more painful, the scarring is permanent, and many women report an intangible, yet very real, perception
that a non-vaginal delivery is somehow "unnatural" and "a failure." For a comprehensive explanation of
the emotional differences between women who have vaginal births and those who have a cesarean de-
livery, see M. SAMUELS, M.D. & N. SAMUELS, NEW WELL PREGNANCY BOOK 370-73 (1996). Women
who undergo a cesarean section also face additional post-natal complications, such as uterine and uri-
nary tract infections. In addition, they are three times more likely to have postdelivery infertility, must
stay an additional 2-3 days in the hospital, and are more likely to have to pay some bills out of their own
pockets. See Donohoe, supra note 108, at 201-02. For an extensive list of possible complications
women may face after a cesarean section see Donohoe, supra note 108, at 201-02. Additionally, cesar-
ean section deliveries whether because they involve blood transfusions or for other reasons, violate the
religious beliefs of many United States women.
114 Cesarean sections present high costs to the health care system. In 1991, the estimated cost of
unnecessary cesarean sections was $1.3 billion. See Karen A. Butler, Health Care Quality Revolution:
Legal Landmines for Hospitals and the Rise of the Critical Pathway, 58 ALB. L. REV. 843, 853 (1995).
115 As one commentator explains:
What are an obstetrician's alternatives when thrust into [this situation]?... An obvious al-
ternative advocated by many is to do nothing and let the fetus die .... Can you imagine the level
of frustration this alternative creates in the medical profession? ... To override her decision...
would only lead to further erosion of the trust embodied in the doctor-patient relationship and
promote coerced health care .... [However,] the obstetrician's primary concern is not the erosion
of trust or coerced health care, but timely delivery of the fetus.
Phelan, supra note 61, at 472.
94:451 (2000)
HeinOnline  -- 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 479 1999-2000
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The urgency of the proposed cesarean section will be impressed upon the
pregnant woman by any or all of a number of individuals within the health-care
setting---doctors, nurses, social workers, ethicists, pastoral care workers and
even hospital attorneys.' 6 If time permits, these individuals will approach her
in the hospital setting, where they will attempt to isolate and evaluate her rea-
sons for refusing treatment 1 7 If her grounds are non-religious, a psychiatric
evaluation may be ordered, so that she might be declared an incompetent, and
an alternate decisionmaker appointed to consent to the procedure.' 18
Throughout this "persuasion" phase, the woman's doctor likely will be
in contact with the hospital attorney, urging him or her to seek a court order
compelling the woman to undergo surgery. Neither doctors nor hospital
personnel are obliged to advise the woman that she has a legal right to ref-
use treatment and that she may wish to hire a lawyer in order to ensure that
her interests are protected. Ultimately, many institutions will attempt to
compel the woman's compliance by obtaining a court order.1 9 Judges may
116 In the context of a dispute over a proposed cesarean section, the patient's condition makes her
particularly vulnerable. Therefore, physicians have an extraordinary amount of control over the course
of treatment. This control often permits the doctor to persuade the patient to comply with his recom-
mendation without his having to resort to judicial intervention. See Ouellette, supra note 6, at 937.
117 However, doctors and hospitals frequently escalate these conflicts into legal actions before iden-
tifying the woman's true reasons for refusing the proposed treatment. For example, in the Bricci case,
an obstetrician who interviewed the couple learned that the basis for their refusal to permit doctors to
induce labor stemmed from their belief that labor should not be induced until the pregnancy was at full-
term, and that this would not occur until the fortieth week of pregnancy. When the doctor explained that
a 38-week pregnancy is full term, the couple was far more amenable to induction, but by then, court
proceedings were well underway, and the two sides were polarized. Interview with Susan Wishnick,
ACLU attorney and one of Bricci's lawyers, Chicago, I11. (July 1998). See also infra note 119. In an-
other case, a hospital attorney refused to assent to doctors' pleas to pursue a court-ordered cesarean sec-
tion until social workers interviewed the patient. The social workers learned that the woman's refusal
was predicated upon her fear that if the baby was born prematurely it would be mentally retarded, as was
the woman's sister, who had been born prematurely. (This case arose at the University of Michigan
hospital in the mid-1980s, when the author of this Article was an employee there.)
118 In situations where a patient is deemed incompetent to consent to treatment but there is no im-
mediate threat to the patient's life, the law clearly requires doctors to identify an alternate decision-
maker. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 666 (N.J. 1976) (articulating the doctrine of substituted
judgment). Although the evidentiary standards guiding surrogate decisionmakers vary from state to
state, generally speaking, they are asked to render a decision that reflects the patient's wishes. In reality,
however, the line of cases involving court-ordered cesarean sections reveals that many hospitals skip
this step and simply request the court's permission to order the surgery on behalf of the fetus. See, e.g.,
In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 (D.C. 1990) (in which the appellate court ruled that once the doctors
determined that the patient was incompetent consent for surgery should have been sought from the pa-
tient's husband). A recent British case demonstrates the power consolidated in the hands of mental
health professionals in such cases. When a pregnant patient rejected her doctor's advice that she un-
dergo a cesarean section, a social worker was solicited, the woman was "sectioned" for assessment un-
der the Mental Health Act, and finally she was admitted to a psychiatric hospital. Clare Dyer, Birth of a
Dilemma, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), Mar. 11, 1997, at 17.
119 For decades, court-ordered cesarean sections were granted as a matter of course, and women
were forced to undergo surgery to which they did not consent. Kolder, supra note 6; Nancy K. Rhoden,
Cesareans and Samaritans, 15 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 118 (1987). In the 1990s, several well-
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enter these orders on an emergency basis, after a brief telephone consulta-
tion with a doctor, and without ever hearing the woman's objections.120 In-
deed, in most of the cases that have been litigated on this point, the women
were unrepresented at the initial hearing. 121
Even though several recent decisions have upheld the woman's right to
refuse the surgery, there is little reason to believe that this form of maternal-
doctor conflict will soon dissipate.122 First, many jurisdictions around the
country have yet to decide this issue, or have old case law supporting the
right to compel surgery. 123  Second, even the decisions upholding the
woman's right to refuse unwanted surgery leaves some leeway for an alter-
publicized judicial decisions rejected this practice as legally unfounded and upheld the woman's right to
refuse treatment. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 (D.C. 1990); In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d
326 (I11. App. Ct. 1994). The practice of resorting to the law to force women to comply with medical
advice emerges as particularly ironic in view of the widespread consensus that cesarean sections are
over-utilized in this society. For example, the Public Citizen Health Research Group in Washington,
D.C., estimates that nearly half of the one million cesareans performed every year are unnecessary. See
International Cesarean Awareness Network (visited Aug. 1, 1998) <http://www.childbirth.orgCAN/
icanavoid.html>.
Although it is impossible to design a retrospective study evaluating how many of doctor-recommended
cesarean sections actually were necessary to maternal or fetal well-being, a surprising number of cases
in which women refused treatment have ended favorably for mother and baby alike. Baby Boy Doe pro-
vides a recent example of this. In 1993, Talitha Bricci, a competent, married pregnant woman, was in-
formed by her doctor that, absent a cesarean section, her child's life was in danger, and mental
retardation likely would result, should the child survive. When the parents refused the procedure, doc-
tors and, hospital officials contacted the state's attorneys' office, which sought custody of the fetus in
order to compel the cesarean section. Included in their petition for custody was a medical expert's tes-
timony that the fetus's chances of surviving a natural labor were close to zero. Further, any slim chance
of survival would result in severe retardation. Nevertheless, the court denied the state's petition, and
reaffirmed the mother's autonomy rights. See, eg., Theodore Postel, The Right to Refuae Medical
Treatment, CH. DAILY L. BULL., Dec. 14, 1994, at 1, 20. Two weeks later, the mother vaginally deliv-
ered a healthy baby boy. Maureen O'Donnell, Anti-Cesarean Parents Celebrate Boy's 1st Birthday,
CHI. SUN TIMES, Dec. 23, 1994, at 3. See Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 326. For a list of cases with
similar outcomes, see Rhoden, supra note 118, at 118-19. See, eg., Hasemeier v. Smith, 361 S.W.2d
697, 697-99 (Mo. 1962) (woman died from anesthetic given during cesarean section to remove baby
physician thought was dead but was actually alive and healthy; husband brought wrongful death action).
120 This certainly was the case as recently as the late 1980s. See interview with Mr. Edward Gold-
man, University of Michigan Medical Center Attorneys Office (July 1998). Indeed, one Chicago hos-
pital lawyer bemoaned judges' increasing reluctance to grant these orders over the phone and recalled
that in the good old days (prior to the 1993 Bricci ruling which upheld the woman's right to refuse
treatment), they could simply call their favorite judge in the Probate Division, and the order would be
issued. See Mr. E. Michael Kelly, Attorney at Hinshaw & Culbertson, Address to DePaul Law School
Health Law & Policy class (Sept. 22, 1994). Similarly, Max Brown, an attorney with Rush-Presbyterian
Medical Center, was quoted in the CHICAGO TRIBUNE as saying that the hospital had previously dealt
with five or six cases similar to the Bricci case. However, he lamented, "what's unusual in this one is
that the trial judge refused to order the woman to undergo a cesarean." Jan Crawford & Jean Latz Grif-
fin, Cesarean Poses a Dilemmafor Hospitals, CH. TRIB., Dec 19, 1993, at Cl.121 See Finer, supra note 8; Scott, supra note 105, at 617.
122 SeeA.C, 573 A.2d at 1235; BabyBoy Doe, 632 N.E2d at 326, Fetus Brown, 689 N.E2d 397 (Il1. 1997).
123 See Scott, supra note 105, at 624-27 (describing several examples of recent cases where the
court compelled women to have treatment to which they would not consent).
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native outcome under "more extreme" circumstances. 24 Third, and most
important, these conflicts typically arise at or near the time that the woman
is beginning labor, when she is unlikely to be in a position to confront her
doctor or to hire an advocate to assert her rights for her. In such a situation,
even a hollow threat of legal intervention might be sufficient to lead the
woman to capitulate to her doctor's will. Indeed, doctors at Chicago's
Rush-Presbyterian Medical Center, interviewed at the time of the Bricci
case, admitted that they recently had had five or six similar cases, but that
the women had backed down when legal action was threatened. 125
These high-drama cases illustrate the truly adversarial potential in the
contemporary relationship between doctors and their pregnant patients. Yet,
in the vast literature generated by this particular type of maternal-doctor con-
flict, no one has addressed the legitimacy of these doctors' actions. It is criti-
cal to recognize that it is the doctor who identifies the conflict, the doctor
who transforms a patient's assertion of her right to bodily integrity and
autonomy into an adversarial confrontation, and the doctor who breaches the
patient's trust and confidentiality by enlisting unrelated third parties to pres-
sure her into submitting to surgery. From the patient's perspective, the doc-
tor's shift from ally to adversary comes as a betrayal. Regardless of whether
the woman ultimately succeeds in enforcing her right to refuse treatment, the
breach of the trusted relationship between doctor and patient remains unre-
dressed. Doctors pose as fiduciaries to their pregnant patients, but pregnant
women are unable to hold them accountable as such.
C. Doctors' Responses to Their Pregnant
Patients' Use of Controlled Substances
Beginning in the late 1980s, several well-publicized studies called
public attention to the problems arising from pregnant women's use of con-
trolled substances. Specifically, this research demonstrated that the use of
124 The court in A.C. limited the competent woman's right to reject a cesarean section in "virtually
all cases," therefore leaving room for court intervention in extreme cases. The court also left an opening
for possible intervention by future courts stating: "We do not quite foreclose the possibility that a con-
flicting state interest may be so compelling that the patient's wishes must yield, but we anticipate that
such cases will be extremely rare and truly exceptional." A.C., 573 A.2d at 1252. Two more recent Illi-
nois decisions upholding the pregnant woman's right to refuse a cesarean section to "save" a full-term
fetus suggest that, at least in Illinois, there may be no such thing as circumstances justifying court inter-
vention. See Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 326; Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d at 405. Note that, after the
courts refused to intervene, both of these cases resulted in successful vaginal deliveries of healthy babies.
125 An obstetrician at one prestigious Chicago medical center proudly explained how he always
complied with American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) guidelines, which require
that doctors honor the woman's refusal of a cesarean section. See infra note 175 and accompanying text
(regarding ACOG Committee Opinion #55). However, faced with a situation similar to the one in
Bricci, he would "probably do the same thing that the doctors from St. Joseph Hospital did-exhaust all
possible remedies to intervene." Indeed, he acknowledged having twice brought suits to "persuade"
women to have cesareans and both times the women agreed to the surgery when faced with legal action.
See Crawford & Griffin, supra note 119.
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drugs by pregnant women was widespread, and that it was linked to a num-
ber of harmful outcomes in their offspring. 26
The medical community, either individually or through such represen-
tative organizations as the American Medical Association, might have re-
sponded to this information in any number of ways. They could have
treated it in much the same way as they have alcohol consumption by preg-
nant women-that is, by viewing it as more of a social problem than a
health problem, and doing little more than occasionally counseling pregnant
patients against using drugs. Given that there is far more damning evidence
regarding the long-term negative consequences for the offspring of pregnant
women who consume alcohol, as opposed to illicit drugs, such a response
would have been entirely reasonable. 127  Alternatively, because they had
reason to know of the shortages in drug treatment programs for pregnant
women (given that a majority of facilities simply refuse to admit most
pregnant addicts), the medical community might have mounted a proactive
campaign to demand that pregnant women be given priority access to drug
treatment.128 They might have decided that the outpouring of public con-
126 See Ira J. Chasnoff et al., Cocaine Use in Pregnancy, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 566 (1985); see
also Michelle D. Mills, Comment, Fetal Abuse Prosecutions: The Triumph of Reaction Over Reason,
47 DEPAUL L. REv. 989 (1998) (summarizing recent studies on substance abuse during pregnancy). Of
course, none of this information should have been surprising, because studies from earlier decades
documented the harms arising out of heroin use and alcohol by pregnant women. See, e.g., C. A.
Abrams, Cytogenetic Risks to the Offspring of Pregnant Addicts, 2 ADDICTIVE DISEASES 63 (1975); J. F.
Connaughton, Health Care for Pregnant Addicts, I AUSTRALASIA NURSES J. 18 (1972); A. F. Ghodse et
al., The Effect of Maternal Narcotic Addiction on the Newborn Infant, 7 PSYCHOL. MED. 667 (1977); K.
L. Jones & D. W. Smith, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome Experience with 41 Patients, 235 JAMA 1458-60
(1976); K. L. Jones & D. W. Smith, Recognition of the Fetal Alcohol Syndrome in Early Infancy, 2
LANCET 999-1001 (1973).
127 One group of researchers recently decried the over-emphasis on prenatal cocaine use and conse-
quent de-emphasis on alcohol use. "Public health interventions should aim to forestall alcohol and to-
bacco use during pregnancy in all racial and ethnic groups. Much popular and political concern has
focused on illicit drug use during pregnancy, especially the use of 'crack' cocaine." William Vega et al.,
Prevalence and Magnitude ofPrenatal Substance Exposures in California, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 850-54
(1993). Unlike alcohol, the teratogenicity of which is so clearly established that there is no longer any rea-
sonable debate about its causal relationship to mental retardation, there is considerable academic contro-
versy surrounding the extent to which bad birth outcomes may be attributed to maternal cocaine use. The
newest studies on matemal cocaine use indicate that "exposure to cocaine does not, in and of itself, ad-
versely affect childhood development... former cocaine babies are demonstrably slow to develop intel-
lectually but that has more to do with their economic disadvantage than any drug use by their mothers."
Robin Blumner, The Myth of the Cocaine Babies, ST. PErERSBURG (FLA.) TIMES, Dec. 7, 1997, at 6D.
12 See Michelle Oberman, Sex, Drugs, Pregnancy, and the Law: Rethinking the Problems of Preg-
nant Women Who Use Drugs, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 516 (1992) (detailing various reasons why clinics
have excluded pregnant women, the primary reason being fear of liability). See also ROBERTS, supra
note 7, at 187-94. "Most treatment centers either refuse to treat pregnant women or are effectively
closed to them because they are ill-equipped to meet the needs of pregnant addicts." Id. at 188. Some
groups have protested the exclusion of pregnant women from drug treatment centers as a violation of
human rights. For example, in 1993, the New York Court of Appeals declared invalid a hospital policy
barring all pregnant women from detoxification programs without a showing of medical necessity. The
court found that such a policy violated the New York Human Rights Law. See Elaine W. v. Joint Dis-
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cern regarding harm to fetuses from drugs signaled the public's readiness to
take action on the myriad issues, including drug use, that impair fetal and
newborn well-being in this country. Toward this end, doctors might have
sought to increase public awareness of the factors underlying the inflated
U.S. infant mortality rate, including limited access to prenatal care, poor
nutrition and unhealthy environment and living conditions. 29
To a small extent, doctors' actual responses to the heightened aware-
ness of substance abuse by pregnant women included all of the above.130 A
second type of response, however, constituted a radical departure from the
trust that had formerly marked the doctor-patient relationship: some doc-
tors forged an alliance with criminal justice authorities in order to detect
and punish their patients who used drugs.
eases N. Gen. Hosp., 613 N.E.2d 523 (N.Y. 1993). See also Suit Seeks Drug Treatment for Pregnant
Women, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1998, at 62.129 The most recent studies on prenatal cocaine use suggest that it is these factors, rather than the
drug itself, which combine to indelibly affect the child's cognitive ability. "These findings suggest that
the culprit in slowed development is not one single factor such as prenatal exposure to cocaine but all of
the deleterious effects associated with poverty." Susan FitzGerald, Crack Baby's Fears May Have Been
Overstated: Children of Cocaine-Abusing Mothers Are No Worse Off than Others in Urban Poverty,
Study Says, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1997, at 10. In fact, one of the leading scholars in this field, Dr. Ira
Chasnoff, recently reported his latest findings in the New York Academy Annals of Science. Id. His
long-term study, tracking 100 drug exposed children, from birth to the present, challenges the notion that
cocaine significantly impairs IQ. He thus refutes the earlier theories posited by scientists (himself in-
cluded) and concludes that the single best predictor of childrens' cognitive development was their home
environment. See Jeremy Manier, Addiction Shadows Crack-Exposed Kids, CHI. TRim., July 12, 1998,
at 12. Note, however, that Chasnoff's study does find that cocaine-exposed children exhibit some be-
havioral problems. Id.
130 For example, official medical sounding boards, such as the Journal of the American Medical As-
sociation and the American Academy of Pediatrics, criticized the punitive approach to the problem of
prenatal substance abuse. They noted the deleterious effect that prosecutions would have on public
health in general, and the health of substance-abusing women and their offspring, in particular. Such
considerations led the American Medical Association Board of Trustees to oppose criminal sanctions for
a pregnant woman's harmful behavior towards her fetus and to urge, instead, that pregnant substance
abusers be provided with proper rehabilitative treatment attuned to their specific psychological and
physiological needs. American Medical Association, Board of Trustees, Legal Intervention During
Pregnancy: Court Ordered Medical Treatments and Legal Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behavior
by Pregnant Women, 264 JAMA 2663, 2670 (1990). Similarly the American Academy of Pediatrics
warned, "[p]unitive measures taken toward pregnant women, such as criminal prosecution and incar-
ceration, have no proven benefits for infant health." American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on
Substance Abuse, Drug-Exposed Infants, 86 PEDIATRICS 639, 641 (1990). Many state medical associa-
tions similarly decried the move towards prosecution. The California Medical Association [CMA], for
example, in condemning the arrests of pregnant addicts, found criminal charges to be both discrimina-
tory and inappropriate. The CMA expressed grave concern that such a policy would ultimately cause
greater harm to both mother and fetus by discouraging women from seeking prenatal care or from pro-
viding health care workers with accurate information. See Jeffrey B. Phelan, The Maternal Abdominal
Wall: A Fortress Against Fetal Health Care?, 65 S. CAL. L. RE.. 461, 475 (1991). Other public ex-
perts opposing prosecution include the American Nurses Association, American Public Health Associa-
tion, American Society of Addiction Medicine, and many others. See Michelle Mills, Comment, Fetal
Abuse Prosecutions, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 989, 998 & n.71 (1998).
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Over the course of the past decade, there have been numerous prose-
cutions of pregnant women under laws governing drug use and transmis-
sion.1 31  Many authors have written about the policy issues raised by the
punitive responses to substance abuse by pregnant women. 132 Virtually all
of these articles conclude that there is little legitimate legal precedent up-
holding the punishment of this population, and that policy reasons militate
against this punitive response.1 3 To date, however, little or no attention has
been paid to the role doctors play in identifying these women and offering
them up to the criminal justice system.
A brief review of several cases reveals the profound breach of trust
afoot in many of these cases. For instance, the case of Wisconsin ex rel.
Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki involved a pregnant woman whose obstetrician
suspected that she was using drugs.1 34 Over the course of several months in
which Angela scheduled and attended her prenatal appointments, her doctor
surreptitiously tested her for drugs. After three months of positive drug
tests, her doctor confronted her with the results of the tests and demanded
that she seek treatment. A month later, at her next prenatal appointment,
her doctor again tested her without her consent. The test was positive, and
the doctor again confronted her with the results. When Angela failed to
keep her next appointment, the doctor reported his "concerns" to the
Waukesha County authorities, who filed a "Motion to Take an Unborn
Child into Custody." By order of the Waukesha County Juvenile Court, she
was thereafter confined to an inpatient drug facility.
135
A similar pattern of behavior was demonstrated by the health care
workers involved in the case of Jennifer Johnson. 136 In this case, in an ef-
fort to obtain help for her addiction, Ms. Johnson confided to her doctor and
131 Since the early 1980s, more than 200 women in over thirty jurisdictions have been prosecuted
for ingesting drugs while pregnant. Lynn Smith, Punish or Protect?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1996, at El.
132 See, ag., Nancy J. Bennett, Drug Exposed Newborns: Alternatives to Punitive Sanction of the
Mother-A Coordinated Response, 24 J. HEALTH & HOSP. L. 182 (1991); Stephen R. Kandall & Wendy
Chavkin, Illicit Drugs in America: History, Impact on Women and Infants, and Treatment Strategies for
Women, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 615 (1992); Nancy K. Schiff, Note, Legislation Punishing Drug Use During
Pregnancy: Attack on Women's Rights in the Name of Fetal Protection, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 197
(1991); Derk B.K. VanRaalte IV, Note, Punitive Policies: Constitutional Hazards of Non-Consensual
Testing of Women for Prenatal Drug Use, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 443 (1995).
133 See, eg, Bennett, supra note 131; Schiff, supra note 131. But see Charles Molony Condon, ainton's
Cocaine Babies, Why Won't the Administration Let Us Save Our Children?, 72 POL'Y REV. 12 (1995).
134 561 N.W.2d 729,732 (Wis. 1997).
131 See id. at 732-33. Ultimately, the Wisconsin Supreme Court vindicated Angela's rights by
holding that the CHIPS statute did not grant the state jurisdiction over fetuses. See id. at 740. This deci-
sion did not come soon enough to prevent Angela from being detained for the final month of her preg-
nancy, during which time her baby was born.
136 This case was the first in the nation to reach a state supreme court. The Florida Supreme Court
overturned the lower courts' convictions of Ms. Johnson, noting that the transmission to minors statute
never was intended to apply to transfers via the umbilical cord. Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla.
1992), quashing Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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a series of health care providers that she was addicted to cocaine. In stark
contrast to the dictates of doctor-patient confidentiality in the fiduciary re-
lationship, Johnson's doctor elected to file a report with state child protec-
tion authorities on behalf of the fetus, and he provided the most damaging
evidence against her at trial. Indeed, when Johnson was charged with de-
livering a controlled substance to a minor, the doctor's testimony regarding
blood traveling through the umbilical cord to the fetus in the moments im-
mediately after birth became the centerpiece of the prosecution's drug de-
livery case. Others who divulged information that Johnson had confided
in them included a child-protection investigator and an ambulance driver.
In sum, the entire case against Johnson was predicated upon information
that she, of her own accord, shared with health care workers in the hope of
helping her children. 138
Perhaps the most notorious example of breach of fiduciary duty in the
context of prenatal substance abuse involves the Medical College of South
Carolina, where doctors and criminal justice authorities worked together to
design a protocol that entailed the surreptitious nonconsensual testing of
patients seeking prenatal care, combined with threats of criminal prosecu-
tion for those who, after testing positive, failed to comply with a drug
treatment protocol. During the first few months of the program, women
who tested positively were inmediately arrested. Of the resulting forty-two
arrests, forty-one involved African-American patients. In some instances,
patients were arrested within days, or even hours, of giving birth. Patients
were dragged from hospitals and homes in leg shackles and handcuffs,
some still bleeding. In one instance, a woman was handcuffed to her bed
during the entire course of her delivery. 139
In a sense, doctors' exasperation with pregnant patients who use drugs
is understandable. As is the case with all addicts, they tend to have spo-
radic and inconsistent behavior, they appear to be irresponsible, and, of
course, they are unable to control their cravings for a substance that is
threatening not only their own well-being, but also that of their fetus.140
However, an additional subtext in these cases is that, like society in general,
137 According to Professor Dorothy Roberts, assistant state's attorney Jeff Deen built his case of
drug delivery through the testimony of the obstetricians who attended the births of Carl and Jessica, Drs.
Randy Tompkins and Mitchell Perlstein. "Dr. Tompkins, who delivered Jessica, testified that even after
delivery 'maternally altered' blood circulates between the placenta and the baby through the still-
attached umbilical cord." ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 163. Tompkins added that once Jessica was deliv-
ered from the birth canal she was a person and no longer a fetus, even though the umbilical cord was
still attached. Perlstein, who delivered Carl, testified to similar facts with respect to Carl's birth. See id.138 See ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 162-64.
139 See id. at 166.
140 See generally, Oberman, supra note 127, at 512-14 (discussing the self-esteem problems of drug
addicted women).
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doctors tend to associate this problem with poor women of color.14' That is,
despite statistics indicating that prenatal substance abuse occurs at similar
rates across racial lines, doctors are far more likely to suspect, test, and re-
port women of color for using illicit drugs during pregnancy. 142 Perhaps
race is the factor that accounts for the formerly unimaginable responses of
some doctors to these patients in crisis: testing a patient without her con-
sent, threatening her with criminal action if she fails to follow his advice,
and ultimately violating her trust by informing criminal justice authorities
of her drug use. As Professor Dorothy Roberts has so powerfully demon-
strated, the notion of violating the civil rights of a pregnant woman of color
comes almost as second nature in a society that long has regarded this
population and their offspring as public property.' 43
Obviously, the surreptitious drug testing and reporting of pregnant
women represents only a small part of what pregnant women have been
subjected to in the name of protecting their fetuses. Given that arrest and
incarceration represent a far greater violation of rights than a surreptitious
drug test, it is no wonder that the litigation and the academic literature
dealing with such incidents focuses far more on the actions of law enforce-
ment authorities than on the actions taken by doctors with regard to their
patients. This does not mean that these doctors' actions are permissible.
Indeed, under basic tort principles, a doctor who tests a patient without her
consent, and then notifies public authorities of the test results, has both
committed a battery and violated the duty of confidentiality. 144 It is equally
clear that, while holding himself out to the patient as a fiduciary, the doctor
has forsaken the trusted nature of the fiduciary relationship and has aban-
doned his obligations of loyalty to the patient who sought his care.
IV. REMEDYING THE BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
The foregoing illustrations of maternal-doctor conflict each involve
doctors who breach the fiduciary duty owed to their pregnant patients.
They do so with impunity. Indeed, the entire "two-patient" model of mod-
em obstetrical medical practice tacitly concedes this breach of duty by in-
141 See ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 172; Ira J. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug [sic]
or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County,
Florida, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1202 (1990).
142 See Chasnoffet al., supra note 141, at 1202.
143 See ROBERTS, supra note 7; Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies:
Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1480 (1991); Dorothy E.
Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood, 9 MICH. L. REv. 938 (1997).
144 See supra note 49. See also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990)
(physician's unauthorized use of patient's cells to develop commercial cancer treatment gave rise to
cause of action for lack of informed consent); Hamish v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 439 N.E.2d 240
(Mass. 1982) (physician's failure to advise patient of possible complications to cosmetic surgery con-
stituted professional misconduct); Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726 (Tenn. 1998) (doctor's implanta-
tion of experimental screws in spine without patient's consent constituted fraudulent concealment).
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sinuating the notion of divided loyalties into the doctor-patient relationship.
Current law poses both practical and legal obstacles to a pregnant woman's
ability to hold her doctor accountable for the breach of fiduciary duty. This
Part describes these obstacles and then suggests two mechanisms designed
to secure to pregnant women the same quality of fiduciary loyalty that phy-
sicians accord all of their other patients.
A. The Lawsuit: Pregnant Women s Claims Against
Doctors for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
The first step in articulating a legal claim for the breach of fiduciary
duty requires that the plaintiff establish the nature of the doctor's duty to-
ward her. In the context of prenatal care, as in the context of any doctor-
patient relationship, the doctor owes the patient a duty of loyalty.t45 As in
any tort-based lawsuit, to the extent that the doctor has breached that duty,
with resultant harm to the patient, the patient should be permitted to recover
damages. As described in the earlier discussion of patient autonomy, the
doctor's fiduciary duty to his patients is rooted in, yet broader than, the ob-
ligation to abide by a patient's refusal of care. The patient has a right not
only to be free from unwanted touching, but also to rely upon her doctor as
a fiduciary-as "the advocate and champion of his patient, upholding the
patient's interest above all others."146
Maternal-doctor conflicts encompass a broad set of actions, some of
which plainly are actionable under current medical malpractice doctrine.
For example, a patient who was subjected to nonconsensual testing or
treatment might sue her doctor for actions such as battery, failure to obtain
informed consent, and breach of confidentiality. Yet, many maternal-doctor
conflicts never rise to the level of these torts, because doctors succeed,
through repeated emotional appeals and threats of legal intervention, in ex-
torting a consent to treatment from the pregnant patient.
Establishing the breach of a fiduciary duty is relatively easy if the pa-
tient can demonstrate that the doctor's actions constituted malpractice. In-
deed, many malpractice claimants also assert claims for breach of fiduciary
duty. 47 Technically speaking, though, in the case of many maternal-doctor
145 See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text (regarding duty of loyalty). Recent case law
holds that the common law duty of loyalty binds even those who provide health care under the ERISA
law, and thus enjoy preemption from state law tort claims. See, e.g., Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625,
628 (8th Cir. 1997) ("ERISA fiduciaries must comply with the common law duty of loyalty, which in-
cludes the obligation to deal fairly and honestly with all plan members.").
146 AD Hoc COMM. ON MED. ETHICS, supra note 19 (emphasis added). See also COUNCIL ONETHICAL AND JUD. AFF., supra note 19 (noting that conflicts between a patient and her physician ought
to be resolved to the patient's benefit, owing to the "physician's role as a fiduciary, i.e., a person who,
by his undertaking, has a duty to act primarily for another's benefit").
147 Research indicates, however, that these claims seldom provide independent grounds of recovery.See Rodwin, supra note 16, at 242 (concluding that "the law holds doctors accountable as fiduciaries
only in restricted situations").
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conflicts, it may not be "malpractice" for the doctor to have adopted the fe-
tus as a second patient and attempted to coerce the pregnant woman into ac-
cepting the doctor's treatment of choice. In fact, such actions on the
doctor's part may be standard operating procedure or, at the very least, suf-
ficiently commonplace that a court could not classify them as a violation of
the standard of care.
Thus, a central problem for those who would redress the harms perpe-
trated by doctors who impose their will upon their pregnant patients is that
of articulating a remedy in cases that do not also involve medical malprac-
tice. It is clear that there are harms that exist independently of medical
malpractice. The pregnant patient sought care from the doctor, placing her
health and life in his hands, and relied upon the doctor to honor her, "up-
holding her interests above all others."148 In generating a conflict between
himself and the patient, and attempting to impose a specific course of action
on his patient for the ostensible benefit of the fetus, the doctor betrayed the
patient's trust. This betrayal is a-breach of fiduciary duty, for which the
patient should be permitted to recover, regardless of whether it constitutes
an independent tort, such as a battery.
There are several obstacles to positing an independent claim for the
breach of fiduciary duty. First, the actions constituting breach of fiduciary
duty are ill-defined, potentially encompassing behavior ranging from
"counseling" to outright threats. Given this lack of clear boundaries, physi-
cians might with reason claim that the threat of liability conflicts with their
obligation to counsel patients regarding the preferred course of treatment.
This obligation is integral to the practice of medicine and, indeed, legally
mandated by the law of informed consent, and doctors might therefore ar-
gue that no liability should be imposed.1 49 The response to this argument is
that, insofar as doctors clearly articulate the range of possible courses of
action, noting all of the risks and benefits to the patient as well as to the fe-
tus, the doctor will have honored his fiduciary duty without subjecting him-
self to any risk of liability for breach. However, the moment the doctor
crosses the line into coercion by attempting to persuade the patient to accept
an undesired course of action for the benefit of the fetus and threatening her
with legal consequences should she refuse, the doctor breaches his fiduciary
duty. If the line between counseling and coercion is unclear, it certainly is
no more unclear than the line between standard medical practice and negli-
gence. The tort system long has entrusted juries with the difficult task of
identifying whether and when a doctor has breached his duty to his patient.
There is no reason to believe juries will be any less adept at assessing claims
for breach of fiduciary duty than they are at evaluating other tort claims.
148 AD Hoc COMM. ON MED. EThics, supra note 19 (emphasis added).
149 The law of informed consent requires doctors to indicate a preferred course of action, noting
potential risks and benefits inherent in that course of action, and listing alternatives. See Miller, supra
note 18, at 2100-01.
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A second, more powerful barrier to recovery in a lawsuit for breach of
fiduciary duty following a maternal-doctor conflict grows out of the limited
extent to which the law holds doctors accountable as fiduciaries. As noted
earlier, although doctors readily embrace the fiduciary label, the law has
been slow to hold them accountable as such.5 ° Thus, a plaintiff suing her
doctor for breach of fiduciary duty likely will face a stiffer evidentiary bur-
den than she would in a nonmedical context.
In nonmedical contexts, plaintiffs suing for breach of fiduciary need
not show that they were harmed as a result of the breach.'5 ' Rather, as
Rodwin indicates in his careful discussion of fiduciary liability, "When a
behavior is questionable, courts require fiduciaries to prove that they have
not violated trust," thus facilitating the plaintiffs case by shifting the bur-
den of proof to fiduciaries, who must show that their conduct did not violate
broad fiduciary standards.152
These standards simply do not exist for doctors. Again, Rodwin notes
that "[m]alpractice law-which holds physicians responsible for their neg-
ligence--only adumbrates fiduciary standards. It focuses on technical
clinical competence.' 53 Rodwin identifies various groups, such as state li-
censing boards or hospitals or medical associations, that could establish
competency standards for doctors as fiduciaries, but, as he explains, each of
these groups has been reluctant to enter this regulatory territory. 154 As a re-
sult, the patient's suit against her doctor for breach of fiduciary duty likely
will parallel an ordinary tort suit, in which the patient must demonstrate that
she was harmed by her doctor's breach of duty.
Establishing harm resulting from breach of fiduciary duty will be
challenging because, unlike the typical medical malpractice case, which
generally results in tangible, readily quantified injuries, the harm caused by
a breach of fiduciary duty is less tangible and more dignitary in nature.
This is particularly true if there is no accompanying tort, such as a battery.
In such a case, the woman's ability to recover will depend upon her law-
yer's success in convincing the jury of the gravity of an intangible harm.
This harm occurs when, well into a patient-doctor relationship, a doctor
suddenly determines that his opinion of what constitutes the fetus's best in-
terests is not only more important than its mother's opinion, but also more
important'than his duties toward its mother, his patient.
The success of this complaint may well depend upon the ultimate out-
come of the maternal-doctor conflict itself. In other words, recovery is
likely in a case like Angela Carder's, in which the doctors sought and ob-
tained judicial permission to perform a cesarean section against the patient's
150 See supra notes 30, 35-39 and accompanying text.
151 See Rodwin, supra note 16, at 249.
152 Id. at 25 1.
153 Id. at 249.
154 See id. at 249-51.
HeinOnline  -- 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 490 1999-2000
Mothers and Doctors' Orders
wishes, but succeeded only in accelerating the patient's demise and deliv-
ering a still-born fetus.1 55 Recovery is less likely, however, in cases in-
volving women who used illicit drugs during pregnancy and whose doctors
either threatened them, or actually followed through with reporting them to
criminal justice authorities. The harms at issue in such cases may be
shocking: healthy babies are torn from their mothers and often from their
communities. In some cases, mothers who are fully capable of parenting
lose custody of their children for months, or even years, as the criminal jus-
tice or child protection system slowly processes their cases. 156 Nonetheless,
given the stigma of illicit drug use, the disproportional likelihood that the
plaintiff will be a poor woman of color, and the racism that shapes society's
response to substance abuse by this population, juries are unlikely to be ter-
ribly sympathetic to a mother's claim that her doctor violated his duty of
loyalty to her.1 S7 The same is true for the woman who sues following a co-
erced cesarean section that has produced a healthy baby. Juries likely will
be unwilling to second-guess a doctor whose actions, though aggressive,
may have salvaged the life of a child and its mother.
This problem hints at a broader set of shortcomings inherent in litiga-
tion as a remedy for the breach of fiduciary duty. As is virtually always the
case with litigation on behalf of plaintiffs injured in the health care setting,
the success of any given case depends upon finding a lawyer willing to take
the case on a contingency fee basis. Because of the challenges inherent in
demonstrating the harm caused in these cases, prospective plaintiffs are un-
likely to find attorneys unless they have injuries that are readily identifiable
to juries. Thus, the majority of maternal-doctor conflicts-those that in-
volve divided loyalties, improper coercion, and perhaps a breach of confi-
dentiality, but not necessarily battery or failure to obtain an informed
consent, will be unattractive to most plaintiffs' lawyers.
This is all the more true because of the fact that the standard remedy
for the breach of fiduciary duty is an injunction, rather than monetary dam-
ages.'58 Thus, the plaintiff will have the additional burden of persuading
the court that a doctor's breach of his fiduciary duty to his patient is unlike
most cases involving the breach of fiduciary duty, and that injunctive relief
is inadequate to make this plaintiff whole.
The lack of access to lawyers leads to the final, and perhaps most im-
portant shortcoming of litigating a solution to the widespread incidence of
maternal-doctor conflict: lawsuits are unlikely to bring about systemic
155 After Angela's death, the family sued for three million dollars and the hospital settled for an un-
disclosed amount. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990). Cf. Crawford & Griffin, supra note 119
(discussing Chicago-area hospital attorney's views on lawsuits to force cesarean sections).
156 ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 159-62.
157 Many scholars have commented on the racially discriminatory patterns of testing and reporting
of pregnant women for substance abuse. See Chasnoff et al., supra note 141, at 1202 (finding that black
women are disproportionately reported); Oberman, supra note 127, at 510.
158 Cf. Frankel, supra note 17, at 823, 828.
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change. In the event that the plaintiff has a powerful case for recovery, as
was seen in the case of Angela Carder, doctors will settle. This private set-
tlement is unlikely to yield a broad fiduciary standard against which the
conduct of other doctors might be measured in the future. It will not cause
other doctors practicing in the jurisdiction, let alone doctors around the
country, to rethink the manner in which they betray the trust of their preg-
nant patients by claiming the right to adopt their fetuses as "patients" and to
dictate care to the woman. 159
Addressing the breach of fiduciary duty on a case-by-case basis gives
doctors carte blanche to hold themselves out to their pregnant patients as
"fiduciaries," without any intention of honoring the obligations that this role
carries with it. Women only will realize the costly price of losing their
doctor's loyalty when it is too late. By the time this moment arrives,
women, pregnant and either demoralized or scrambling to find a lawyer to
protect their rights to refuse treatment, are in no position to challenge the
doctor for having breached his fiduciary duty to her. Therefore, maternal-
doctor conflict must be redressed through alternative mechanisms beyond
simply encouraging litigation for the breach of fiduciary duty.
B. Professional Guidelines as Regulatory Mechanisms
Professional societies play an integral role in setting guidelines for op-
timal professional and ethical medical practice. Although technically non-
binding, these guidelines establish a profession's collective vision of
appropriate care and thus serve as a tacit indictment of practices that signifi-
cantly diverge from these standards.' 60 These guidelines range from practice
standards, which are promulgated and published by professional societies and
govern a wide range of clinical situations, to ethical guidelines.16 1
159 Indeed, the only scenario under which such settlements are likely to bring about a change in
medical practice is if they become sufficiently commonplace and costly that insurance companies begin
to balk when forced to make these payments on behalf of the doctors they insure. In this event, insur-
ance companies themselves could begin to pressure doctors to refrain from imposing unwanted treat-
ment upon pregnant women, by practices such as declining to cover liability incurred in this manner, or
even inserting into their insurance contracts exclusionary clauses that preclude reimbursement for liabil-
ity incurred in this manner. Results from utilization review mechanisms created by insurance companies
to evaluate cost-effectiveness may also bring about a change in the way doctors impose treatment. See
Suzanne Seaman, Putting the Brakes on Drive-Through Deliveries, 135 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 497, 500 (1997). Many thanks to Professor Katharine Baker for her insight on this issue.
160 For a thorough and enlightening discussion of the role ofprofessional guidelines in shaping phy-
sician behavior, see David Orentlicher, The Influence of a Professional Organization on Physician Be-
havior, 57 ALB. L. REv. 583 (1994).
161 For example, the American Academy of Pediatrics has set schedules for childhood vaccinations.
See id. at 598, citing COMM. ON INFECTIOUS DISEASES, AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, REPORT OF THE
COMM. ON INFECTIOUS DISEASES, 5-60 (21st ed. 1988). The National Institutes of Health also has de-
veloped guidelines on numerous practice parameters, including cesarean sections. See Orentlicher, su-
pra note 159, at 598, citing Jacqueline Kosecoff et al., Effects of the National Institutes of Health
Consensus Development Program on Physician Practice, 258 JAMA 2708 (1987).
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Perhaps the largest and best known of the professional standard-setting
bodies is the AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs. The Council
is comprised of members who serve single seven-year terms (with the ex-
ception of student and resident members, who serve two- and three-year
terms, respectively). Council guidelines are promulgated in the AMA's
Code of Ethics, which addresses issues ranging from appropriate consent
prior to IV testing to financial conflicts of interest. Physicians who
violate the AMA's Code of Ethics are subject to discipline by the AMA,
and by their county and state medical societies. 63 Additionally, some states
have expressly incorporated the Code of Ethics into their Medical Practice
Acts, thus rendering violations of these ethical guidelines grounds for offi-
cial discipline.164 Other state licensing boards tend to regard the guidelines
as probative evidence of the expected standard of ethical conduct, and they
refer to the guidelines when determining whether a physician has commit-
ted professional misconduct.1 61
Given the weight attributed to these professional guidelines, it is clear
that the promulgation of a policy condemning legal interventions against
pregnant women would serve to ratify and perhaps to strengthen the auton-
omy rights of pregnant women. Although the Code of Ethics lacks a spe-
cific provision dealing with the compulsory treatment of pregnant women,
its provision governing informed consent strongly supports patient auton-
omy. Rule 8.08 provides:
The patient should make his or her own determination on treatment. The
physician's obligation is to present the medical facts accurately to the patient...
and to make recommendations for management in accordance with good medi-
cal practice .... Rational, informed patients should not be expected to act uni-
formly, even under similar circumstances, in agreeing to or refusing treatment. 166
The rule lists only two narrow exceptions to the obligation to obtain in-
formed consent, neither of which is pertinent to the compulsory treatment
167of pregnant women.
In addition to the informed consent provision in the Code of Ethics, in
1990 the AMA's Board of Trustees issued an official policy statement op-
162 See Orentlicher, supra note 159, at 589 (citing CODE OF ETHICs, supra note 60, at § 8.08); Coun-
cil on Ethical and Jud. Aff., Am. Med. Ass'n, Gifts to Physicians from Industry, 265 JAMA 501 (1991).163 See Orentlicher, supra note 159, at 592.
164 See id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(b)(18) (West 1999)).
165 See id. For a detailed discussion of the impact of practice guidelines on judicial determinations
of medical standards of care, see John C. West, The Legal Implications of Medical Practice Guidelines,
27 J. HEALTH & HosP. L. 97 (1994).
166 CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 60.
167 See id. The code cites the conventional exceptions of emergency situations, in which the patientis incapable of consenting and harm from non-treatment is imminent, and the doctrine of "therapeutic
privilege," wherein risk-disclosure poses so serious a threat as to be medically contraindicated. 1d.
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posing court-ordered medical treatments for pregnant women. 168  The
statement declares, "Judicial intervention is inappropriate when a woman
has made an informed refusal of a medical treatment designed to benefit her
fetus .... The physician's duty is to provide appropriate information...
not to dictate the woman's decision."' 69 Furthermore, the policy tacitly
condemns interventions against pregnant substance abusers by concluding
that criminal and civil sanctions against pregnant substance abusers are "in-
appropriate," and that such patients should be "provided with rehabilitative
treatment appropriate to their specific... needs. ' 70
This statement reflects official AMA policy; however, because it is not
part of the Code of Ethics, it does not carry with it an enforcement mecha-
nism. Moreover, the full statement is somewhat equivocal on the subject of
the permissibility of legal intervention in the "exceptional circumstance,"
and it stops short of condemning interventions "[i]n which a medical treat-
ment poses an insignificant or no health risk for the woman, entails a mini-
mal invasion of her bodily integrity, and would clearly prevent substantial
and irreversible harm to her fetus ....
By legitimizing interventions in hypothetical "exceptional" cases, the
AMA policy loses some of the force that it otherwise might have carried as
an official declaration of the impermissibility of compulsory treatment of
pregnant women. The optimal professional guideline for protecting preg-
nant women from coercive medical treatment would be a clear rule banning
all such interventions, issued by the AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs and promulgated in the Code of Ethics. However, as Dr. Stephen
Latham, the former head of the Council staff, notes, the current climate with
regard to abortion in the AMA House of Delegates is so politically charged
that it would be difficult to pass a specific policy governing these interven-
tions.172 Nonetheless, it is critical to note that the practice of compelling
pregnant women to undergo treatment runs so contrary to the broad lan-
guage of the ethical guidelines on informed consent that a specific provision
on pregnancy should be superfluous.1 73
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG)
has a process for setting professional guidelines that is similar to that of the
168 House of Delegates, Am. Med. Ass'n, Policy No. H-420.969, Legal Interventions During Preg-
nancy (1998). See Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, 264 JAMA 2663 (1990), for a full discussion
of this policy.
169 House of Delegates, Am. Med. Ass'n, Policy No. H-420.969, Legal Interventions During Preg-
nancy (1998).
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 See interview with Steve Latham, former director, Ethics Division, American Medical Associa-
tion, in Chicago, Ill. (Jan. 12, 1999).
173 See CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 60.
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AMA. ' 74 Although ACOG guidelines lack an enforcement mechanism,
they nonetheless may serve as probative evidence of the expected standard
of ethical conduct to be utilized in determining whether a physician has
committed professional rnisconduct.1 75 In October 1987, the Committee on
Ethics promulgated Committee Opinion #55, entitled Patient Choice: Ma-
ternal Fetal Conflict. The ACOG guideline is, in large part similar to that of
the AMA. After exploring a variety of potential conflicts and explaining that
they are rare because "the vast majority of pregnant women are willing to as-
sume significant risk for the welfare of the fetus," the opinion concludes:
Obstetricians should refrain from performing procedures that are un-
wanted by a pregnant woman. The use of judicial authority to implement
treatment regimens in order to protect the fetus violates the pregnant woman's
autonomy. Furthermore, inappropriate reliance on judicial authority may lead
to undesirable societal consequences, such as the criminalization of noncom-
pliance with medical recommendations.1 76
The ACOG opinion expands upon the AMA guideline in two interest-
ing respects. First, in addition to providing a theoretical justification for defer-
ring to maternal preferences, it offers the more pragmatic explanation of the
potential for "undesirable societal consequences." In the opinion's main text,
the Committee notes that court orders have a "destructive effect" on the "physi-
cian-patient relationship., 177 Secondly, the ACOG opinion suggests an alter-
native dispute resolution mechanism, namely "[c]onsultation with others,
including an institutional ethics committee," as a preferable alternative to re-
course to the judicial system.1 78 Nonetheless, the ACOG opinion, like that of
the AMA, stops short of condemning the use of judicial authority altogether,
stating instead that "[t]he use of the courts to resolve these conflicts is almost
never warranted."'
179
In addition to its position on "maternal-fetal conflict," ACOG and the
American Academy of Pediatrics have promulgated guidelines regarding the
issue of substance abuse during pregnancy. These guidelines are supportive of
pregnant women's autonomy in concluding that "[u]niversal neonatal screening
for illicit drugs is not recommended" and siressing the need for counseling and
174 ACOG issues Committee Opinions, drafted by specialized sub-committees of its membership.
These opinions are "intended to provide timely information on controversial issues, ethical concerns,
and emerging approaches to clinical management." AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS & AM. C. OF
OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, GUIDELINES FOR PERINATAL CARE (3d ed.1992).
175 See Orentlicher, supra note 159.
176 Committee on Ethics, Am College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Comm. Opinion No. 55,
Patient Choice: Maternal-Fetal Conflict (Oct. 1987).
177 See id.
178 See id.
179 Id. (emphasis added).
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support of pregnant addicts.180 The guidelines do, however, leave open the
possi'bility of periodic, nonconsensual testing for cocaine metabolites, and they
omit any mention of the extent to which such test results should remain confi-
dential. 81 As such, they grant tacit approval to the ongoing practices of selec-
tive testing and discriminatory treatment of poor women of color, who are
disproportionately suspected of drug use by their doctors.18 2
By providing an official condemnation of the practices inherent in gen-
erating maternal-doctor conflicts, professional guidelines may be part of a
solution to this problem. Yet, even if there were explicit professional
guidelines rejecting the compulsory treatment of pregnant women, they
only would be effective to the extent that they became incorporated into
standard medical practice. As Professor Orentlicher concludes, this does
not necessarily happen automatically: "The medical profession's experi-
ence with standard-setting suggests [that] ... professional regulation can
have a substantial impact on physician behavior, but professional guidelines
alone are generally insufficient to change physician behavior. The guide-
lines must be combined with other measures to ensure compliance."' 83
Professor Orentlicher notes that ethics and practice guidelines may be
more readily adopted by physicians when they provide clear rules with a
"credible threat of enforcement from outside of the profession," and when
"violations [can] ... be detected with relative ease." 184 Given the absence
of external pressures, coupled with the general reluctance of physicians to
police their colleagues' behavior and the poor funding of professional dis-
ciplinary boards, the mere issuance of guidelines seldom will suffice to
change physician behavior.'85
There are several additional reasons to fear that maternal-doctor con-
flicts will continue to proliferate even if professional organizations such as
the AMA and ACOG issued specific guidelines mandating deference to the
180 Id. at 225.
181 See id. at 230 ("To reinforce and encourage continued abstinence, periodic urine testing for me-
tabolites of cocaine may be desirable in a pregnant woman admitting to cocaine use prior to or during
pregnancy. The requirement for consent may vary from state to state.").
12 See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
183 Orentlicher, supra note 159, at 591. See also, Jonathan Lomas et al., Do Practice Guidelines
Guide Practice?, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1306 (1989) (discussing the gap between reported physician
agreement with and actual conformance to guidelines concerning cesarean sections).
184 Orentlicher, supra note 159, at 596, 598. Orentlicher analyzes the AMA's gift-giving guidelines
as an example. In the 1980s, the U.S. Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee determined that
drug companies' "gifts" to physicians had evolved from pens and coffee mugs to all-expenses.paid re-
sort vacations for physicians and their spouses. In response to the Committee report, the AMA issued
guidelines explicitly prohibiting the most egregious gift-giving practices. Major pharmaceutical compa-
nies adopted similar guidelines. Bolstered by the widespread industry support, by the fact that physi-
cians understood the rules and could easily observe and report violations, and by a fear of further
government intervention if the problem was not checked, the guidelines curtailed the offending practices
almost immediately. See id. at 592-97.
185 See id. at 604. See also Lomas et al., supra note 182, at 1310.
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autonomous treatment preferences of pregnant patients. First, physicians
perceive these conflicts as ethical, rather than clinical, in nature-that is,
they perceive them as informed and bounded by personal, subjective pre-
rogatives, rather than by objective, scientific criteria. Doctors are therefore
more likely to trust their own judgment in resolving such conflicts than to
adopt the suggestions of national experts. 86 Second, these conflicts arise in
a private context, and because of the power dynamic between the parties,
they seldom escalate to the point of necessitating external, let alone legal,
intervention.187 Thus, physicians who coerce their pregnant patients into
following their treatment preferences have little reason to fear detection by
their professional colleagues. Finally, even if a physician were exposed as
having attempted to pressure a pregnant woman into a given course of ac-
tion, there is virtually no credible threat of professional censure following
from such behavior.
Thus, there is little reason to hope that professional guidelines alone, or
even in conjunction with a threat of litigation for the breach of fiduciary
duty, will be sufficient to remedy the persistent medical undermining of
pregnant women's autonomy rights. As such, it is important to discuss a
third mechanism designed to protect pregnant women from doctors seeking
to assert the right to impose unwanted treatment upon them.
C. Fair Warning to Pregnant Patients: Informed
Consent and the iWo-Patient Model
Physicians who claim, in spite of the absefice of legal support, that the
fetuses carried by their pregnant patients are, in fact, their "second pa-
tients," must nonetheless recognize that the pregnant woman has an undeni-
able right to know that her doctor feels this way.t88 This right is vested in
the fiduciary duty that physicians owe to patients, whereby the law requires
that "the provider transmit to the patient the information necessary to enable
her to maximize her own welfare."' 89 Indeed, this duty extends beyond the
mere obligation to disclose information, because due to the power dispari-
186 See Orentlicher, supra note 159, at 603.
187 See supra notes 143-57 and accompanying text.
188 My thanks to Professor Annette Clark for helping to elucidate the application of fiduciary law to
this particular scenario.
189 Maxwell J. Mehlman, Fiduciary Contracting: Limitations on Bargaining Between Patients and
Health Care Providers, 51 U. PIrr. L. REv. 365, 391 (1990). Mehlman also notes that this duty may be
vested in contract law:
A person's non-disclosure of a fact known to him is equivalent to an assertion that the fact does
not exist ... where he knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a mistake of the other party
as to a basic assumption on which that party is making the contract and if non-disclosure of the fact
amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.
Id. at 385, n.61, citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1981).
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ties between the parties, "the patient has the right to expect total candor
from the provider."' 90
Ample case law supports the notion that providing a patient with the
opportunity for informed consent includes acknowledging the possibility of
the patient obtaining care from another provider "when the first provider
lacks sufficient skill or expertise to render reasonable care."' 9' Clearly, the
reasoning underlying this precedent-that the patient should be aware of a
choice of doctors if the present doctor is unable to perform certain medical
duties-would extend to situations in which a doctor is unwilling to per-
form certain medical duties or obligations.1 92
Thus, it is a breach of informed consent, and of fiduciary duty in gen-
eral, when a physician fails to disclose to his pregnant patient his personal
belief, first, that he owes an independent obligation to the fetus and, second,
that to the extent that he perceives the fetus to be imperiled by the pregnant
woman's conduct, he intends to use all powers available to him to impose
upon her whatever course of action he deems appropriate. It is legally and
ethically abhorrent that doctors who operate on a "two-patient" model pres-
ently neither inform their pregnant patients of their attitudes toward mater-
nal autonomy nor seek the women's permission to treat their fetuses as
"patients." This disclosure should be made during the first prenatal visit, as
part of the initial informed consent, which generally includes a discussion
of the doctor's philosophy regarding the treatment of pregnancy. The doc-
tor should be required to explain the sorts of circumstances in which he
would intervene and attempt to override a woman's preferences, and he
190 Id. at 393. See also id. at 385, n.61, citing Emmett v. Eastern Dispensary & Cas. Hosp., 396
F.2d 931, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("court finds in the fiducial qualities of [the physician-patient] relation-
ship the physician's duty to reveal to the patient that which in his best interests it is important that he
should know"). See also Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d, 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1997), citing Eddy v. Colonial
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 919 F.2d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("duty to disclose material information is the
core of a fiduciary's responsibility, animating the common law of trusts long before the enactment of
ERISA").
191 Mehlman, supra note 188, at 383, n.58, citing Haley v. United States, 739 F.2d 1502 (10th Cir.1984) (physician liable for failing to suggest referral to gastroenterologist). See also Buck v. United
States, 433 F. Supp. 896 (D. Fla. 1977) (physician liable, inter alia, for failing to recommend that snake
bite victim consult specialist); Moore v. Preventive Medicine Med. Group, Inc., 223 Cal. Rptr. 859 (Ct.
App. 1986) (medical group liable for failing to disclose information necessary to allow patient to decide
whether to see specialist).
192 The law governing patient abandonment provides a wealth of useful precedent for this point.Doctors are not obligated to treat, nor need they perform any procedures that violate their personal be-
liefs, but they may not abandon their patients, and must make a referral to an alternate provider. As one
court noted:
Once a physician enters into a professional relationship with a patient, he is not at liberty to
terminate that relationship at will. That relationship will continue until it is ended by one of thefollowing circumstances: (1) the patient's lack of need for further care; or (2) the withdrawingphysician being replaced by an equally qualified physician. Withdrawal from the case under any
other circumstances constitutes a wrongful abandonment of the patient, and if the patient suffers
any injury as a proximate result of such wrongful abandonment, the physician is liable for it.
Ascher v. Gutierrez, 533 F.2d 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (emphasis omitted).
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should advise the woman that she is free to choose other doctors who are
more supportive of a pregnant woman's autonomy.
Such a discussion would serve several useful purposes. It would pro-
vide advance notice to pregnant patients, so that those who are uncomfortable
with a potentially adversarial relationship would have time to discontinue
treatment with this doctor and find a doctor who is willing to treat her with the
same respect for autonomy accorded by law to all patients. It is critical to note,
however, that in today's health-care environment, most women's choices are
somewhat constrained. Even well-insured women often have only a short list
of providers from whom they may choose, and poor women's options for care
are still more limited.193 Thus, just because her doctor discloses his belief that
he has the right to impose his preferred course of treatment upon a pregnant
patient, against her will, does not necessarily mean that the pregnant woman
will be able to secure care from another doctor.
Even if the woman's choice of provider is constrained and she is un-
able to switch doctors, there are secondary benefits to forcing doctors to in-
form their pregnant patients of their positions on "maternal autonomy."
First, the pregnant patient is in a much better position to challenge the le-
gitimacy of her doctor's practices if she learns about them early in her
pregnancy, prior to the onset of an actual conflict. If she learns about them
late in the pregnancy, factors such as being in labor or hesitation aboutjeopardizing a longstanding doctor-patient relationship may constrain her
ability to assert her rights. 194
Second, this approach cannot help but disabuse pregnant patients (and
their doctors) of the notion that their doctor is automatically their ally-
their fiduciary. This restructuring of the doctor-patient relationship may, in
turn, bring about several changes. It may force doctors to reexamine their
values and decide to check their impulses to impose treatment upon preg-
nant women; it may bring about the recognition that such values and im-
pulses can be the outgrowth of misogynistic notions that pregnant women
are somehow less than fully competent. Similarly, by allowing women a
chance to "vote with their feet," this fair warning system may help generate
a market for women-friendly doctors, thus rewarding those doctors who
recognize and abide by their fiduciary obligations.
193 See Michelle Oberman & Margie Schaps, Women's Health and Managed Care, 65 TENN. L.
REv. 555 (1998). Indeed, many poor women have no relationship with a doctor at all during their preg-
nancy, and see the doctor for the first time when they enter a hospital to deliver their baby. Thus, the solu-
tion that I propose would be less feasible for these women, particularly if their labor is very far
advanced. However, even for the population of women receiving little or no prenatal care, one could
imagine a Miranda-style warning being offered by a doctor who intended to see the fetus as his patient.
In response, the woman could either request another doctor, or request to be transferred to another hospital.
194 For example, if the discussion occurs at their first meeting, she might demand that her insurance
plan provide her with another physician, or threaten to report the doctor to a medical society for violat-
ing ethical guidelines. See supra notes 164-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relevant
ethical guidelines mandating respect for patient autonomy.
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Finally, this approach would help foster open communication from the
start of the relationship between doctors and their pregnant patients. One
might object to the fair warning requirement on the grounds that doctors
may not know that they will feel inclined to override a pregnant woman's
will until they are actually faced with a situation where such inclinations
come to the fore, at which point they will perceive themselves as acting out
of an ethical imperative. Not only is the "ethical imperative" at work in
such "crises" unfounded, but these situations arise with sufficient regularity
that all obstetricians should be on notice, and should engage, ex ante, in the
soul-searching process necessary to determine their own preferences. Fur-
thermore, anecdotal evidence suggests that many doctors know full well
that they tend to disfavor maternal autonomy. In Chicago, for example,
there are a small handful of individual physicians and hospitals who are re-
sponsible for the vast majority of recent cases involving attempted court-
ordered treatment of pregnant women. 95
Obviously, there are serious flaws with proposing that maternal-doctor
conflicts can be mediated via informed consent. Most important among
these is the fact that such an approach suggests to doctors that they can as-
sert a "right" to take actions that I have demonstrated to be ethically and le-
gally indefensible. However, the advantage of this approach is that it is
well grounded in current law. In the health-care context, the law of in-
formed consent, unlike the law of fiduciary duty, is well established and
breaches are easily remedied. A plaintiff might rather easily show that her
doctor had a duty to tell her that he was adopting the fetus as a patient and
that, in the event of a disagreement about the course of treatment, the doctor
would attempt to force his preferences upon her. She would then argue
that, had she known her doctor would behave in such a manner, she never
would have continued her relationship with him. Thus, the doctor's failure
to inform her of his practice "philosophy" deprived her of her autonomy
rights, and as a result she suffered damages. In the short run, it may be
easier for pregnant patients to secure the right to this sort of "Miranda-
style" warning than it will be for them to vindicate their broader rights to a
fiduciary relationship with their physician.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has proposed a radical reformulation of conflicts occurring
between doctors and pregnant women in the health care setting. Rather
than permitting doctors to identify and structure these conflicts as arising
between pregnant women and their fetuses, this Article exposes doctors'
central role in generating and escalating these conflicts. By viewing the
doctors' actions through the lens of fiduciary duty doctrine, this Article also
195 See interview with Susan Wishnick, attorney with the ACLU of Illinois Reproductive Freedom
Project (July 1998) (noting the extraordinary workload generated for her office, which defends the rights
of the women involved in these cases, by one local physician, Dr. James Meserow).
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demonstrates that these actions are neither legally nor ethically permissible.
Finally, this Article suggests three legal mechanisms by which pregnant
women might vindicate their rights to be treated like all other competent
patients in the health care setting.
Regardless of whether women begin to bring such lawsuits in large num-
bers, there is critical progress inherent in the relabeling of what has, to date,
mistakenly been called "maternal-fetal" conflict. By insisting that doctors be
held accountable for subordinating the autonomy of their pregnant patients, the
medical profession as a whole will be forced to account for, and to justify, the
fact that certain doctors believe it is appropriate to ignore and undermine the
rights of certain pregnant women. At the very least this will create the condi-
tions necessary for a meaningful discussion of, if not a resolution to, the con-
tinual stream of cases involving maternal-doctor conflict.
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